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ABSTRACT
This project studies the impact of heterogeneous other-regarding preferences on
many issues, such as taxation, government revenue and income inequality. The first two
chapters build upon the literature of relative income effects pioneered by Duesenberry
(1949). This hypothesis says that the utility of an individual depends on not only his
absolute income level, but also his relative income position. An individual gains utility if
his income exceeds the income of most members in his comparison group and loses utility
if his income falls below the income of most members in the group. Most previous studies
consider either a symmetric or a simple version of asymmetric case. In contrast, chapter 1
uses the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to depict a broader heterogeneity:
income-dependent relative income effects. Results suggest that one’s relative income effect
indeed depends on one’s income level.
In chapter 2, we investigate the effect of these income-dependent relative income
effects on an optimal income tax model. Simulation results show that the optimal tax
system becomes more progressive to the extent that the relatively wealthy have stronger
concerns regarding others’ income than the relatively poor. This is an important result
because it may provide theoretical evidence that increasing progressivity can be efficiencyenhancing.
In chapter 3, we consider the effects of other-regarding preferences on equilibrium
labor supply, tax revenue, and income inequality in a society where agents have
heterogeneous skill levels and thus heterogeneous wage rates. Different from the previous
two chapters, the model in this chapter is sufficiently flexible to allow the externality from
agents who are “ahead” to differ in both magnitude and direction from those who are
“behind.” Our findings have important implications for tax policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Unlike neoclassical economics where humans are mainly described as selfinterested, more and more social studies (i.e., Hopkins, 2008; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005;
McBride, 2001; Distante, 2013) have supported the notion that individuals’ welfare
depends not only on their material circumstances but also on their relative position in
society.
Data supporting these views come from at least two directions. First, Duesenberry
(1949) proposed the relative income hypothesis, stating that agents are competitive or
status-seeking, meaning that the increase of others’ income has a negative effect on your
well-being. This hypothesis can explain the “Easterlin Paradox”: survey data on subjective
well-being shows that average happiness scores has not increased correspondingly with the
rapid growth of real GDP per capita in many countries during the past several decades.
Chapter 1 explores the possibility of heterogeneous relative income effects, which
can indicate whether the wealthy or the poor have higher relative income effects. Studying
the true form of relative income effects can help in constructing a more efficient income
taxation system.
Chapter 2 applies the chapter 1’s estimation results to an optimal non-linear income
taxation framework. Specifically, the consequence of incorporating these heterogeneous
relative income effects into a traditional optimal income tax system is explored. If these
relative income effects are as significant as presented in chapter 1, failing to control for
them will cause misspecification of the optimal income tax schedule.
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Data supporting other-regarding preferences also comes from another direction:
choice experiments. Based Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) explicit model, a list of experiments
investigate the inequality averse preferences among participants. Individuals with
inequality averse preferences pursue not only own income or consumption, but also
fairness. Any change to income that increases the distance of their income and others’
decreases their well-being. Chapter 3 embraces this assumption. Constructing a framework
in which agents can be either competitive or inequality averse, we are interested in the
consequence of labor supply behavior, tax revenue, and income inequality after including
these two distinct types of other-regarding preferences.

2

CHAPTER I
ESTIMATING INCOME-DEPENDENT RELATIVE INCOME
EFFECTS IN BRITAIN

3

1. Introduction
Contrary to the claims of neoclassical economists who describe humans as selfinterested individuals, researchers in the social sciences have recently shown that
individuals care about both their own well-being and the well-being of others (for example,
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; McBride, 2001; Distante, 2013). They question the traditional
view of a utility function that only considers one’s own consumption or income levels.
These relative effects assume that people derive utility not only from their own status, but
also from comparing their status with others.
Duesenberry (1949) first proposed the relative income hypothesis, which clearly
explains the “Easterlin Paradox” (Easterlin, 1974). The paradox is that despite substantial
real income growth in Western countries during the past 50 years, no corresponding rise in
reported happiness levels can be observed. This paradox undoubtedly points to relative
income’s impact, rather than absolute income’s, on reported well-being.
The present study fits within the large body of literature Duesenberry pioneered. It
investigates how others’ income levels can affect us. These relative income effects create
negative externalities because an increase in one’s income level reduces another’s wellbeing. Some scholars (i.e., Kanbur & Tuomala, 2013) have considered a policy for
correcting these relative income effects through government intervention, such as taxation.
Many studies in this area have focused on symmetric relative income effects (for
example, Clark and Oswald, 1996; Luttmer, 2005; Liu and Shang, 2012). They have argued
that the magnitude of relative income effects is homogenous within the population.
Generally, they have concluded that others’ income has a substantial and negative impact
4

on one’s own well-being. Holding everything else constant, increased income of one
person’s reference group makes that person worse off.
Duesenberry’s relative income hypothesis is not symmetric. Instead, it states that
relatively poor people derive disutility from comparisons with more wealthy individuals
while the wealthy do not derive utility from comparisons with poorer individuals. These
relative income effects are referred to as being upwards-asymmetric. Many studies have
tested this idea, and the results have generally been mixed. Some studies have agreed with
Duesenberry. For example, Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) found that West Germans have
upwards-asymmetric relative income effects. The well-being of the poor is negatively
influenced by comparing with the income level of their reference group; however, the rich
do not feel happier from knowing their income is higher. Boyce et al. (2010) reported
similar results using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), except they found rich
agents feel happier from having higher income, but the magnitude of this utility from being
ahead is smaller than that of the disutility from being behind.
In contrast, McBride (2001), using the (US) General Social Survey (GSS) data,
revealed that the relative income concerns are in fact asymmetric downwards, meaning the
impact is higher for the rich than for the poor. In addition, Mayraz et al. (2009) evaluated
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and found that relative income effects are
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symmetric, implying there is a homogenous relative income effect within the population.
The utility of being ahead is no different than the disutility of being behind.1
Also, some studies investigate comparisons across countries. Corazzini et al. (2012)
conducted a cross-country experiment using students and found that well-being is
perceived more in relative terms for students in high-income countries than in low-income
countries. This finding implies that relative income effects are stronger when one’s own
income level is higher. However, they also found that personal characteristics, such as
gender and discipline of study, contribute much in determining well-being. A similar
example is Friehe and Mechtel (2014). Taking the division of Germany into the communist
GDR and the democratic FRG and its reunification in 1990 as a natural experiment, these
researchers found relative income effects much higher for East Germans than West
Germans.
A reasonable assumption is that a high-income earner cares differently about his
reference group than a low-income earner. In the literature involving relative income
effects, some studies have supported the idea that the wealthy should have stronger relative
income effects than the poor because the poor devote a large portion of their income to
satisfy their basic needs, thus not much income is left to make luxury purchases and
comparisons with others (Corazzini et al., 2012). However, other scholars have emphasized
the importance of “aspirations,” suggesting that the poor have stronger relative income

1

Mayraz et al. (2009) and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) found different results using the same dataset (GSOEP). The former let subjects
choose the reference group themselves while the latter defined the reference group as all agents at the similar education level, inside the
same age bracket, and living in the same region.
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effects because they have aspirations that tend to be far above their socioeconomic level
(Stutzer, 2004). These upward aspirations are less prevalent for the wealthy, causing them
to have weaker effects. These often opposing results motivate the current study that
explores the relative income effects’ potential heterogeneity.
The current study has two main contributions. First, an interaction term is used to
explore the possibility of income-dependent relative income effects. Most of the studies
cited above explored homogenous relative income effects. Some investigated uniformly
asymmetric relative income effects by categorizing the population into two groups, based
on, for example, whether income level of a person is higher or lower than his reference
group. The current study builds upon the consideration of asymmetric relative income
effects. The assumption of uniform asymmetry is relaxed by allowing the relative income
effect to be a function of one’s position on the income scale. This is a more general form
of heterogeneity: income-dependent relative income effects. We estimate these effects by
regressing a measure of utility on one’s own income, others’ income, and an interaction
term between the two. The interaction term is widely used in economic studies (e.g.,
Spilimbergo, 2009). In the current study, it measure whether relative income effect depends
on the subject’s income level.
Second, Layard (1980) showed that the definition of reference group matters
considerably in this area. Most previous analyses divided the whole population into
different cohorts based on one or two demographic variables, such as age (e.g., aged 20
and under, 21-25, 26-30, etc) and region. However, one disadvantage of constructing
reference groups using that method is that two agents with similar ages living in the same
7

region may not be compared with each other only because their ages are separated by one
of the age thresholds. As a result, in the current study, a cohort is derived for every
individual in the sample. We believe that in the real world, it should be the case that every
person chooses a reference group, probably consisting of individuals with similar
demographic variables, instead of being assigned one. Therefore, instead of assigning
individuals to any age group, the subject’s age group is considered to include all others of
the same age group plus or minus five years.
The estimation results show significant heterogeneity of relative income effects.
Specifically, the poor’s relative income effects (in absolute value) are larger than those of
the wealthy. Exploring the form of relative income effects is important. The literature
already shows the impact of homogenous relative income effects on optimal income
taxation. The present study shows that allowing heterogeneous relative income effects can
help in better understanding the force behind well-being and build a more efficient income
tax system to better account for people’s actions.

2. The Econometric Framework
To estimate income-dependent relative income effects, a utility proxy is regressed on
own income, the average income of the individual’s reference group, and the interaction of
the two.
Following Layard et al. (2008), individual 𝑖 has a level of experienced utility 𝑢𝑖 ,
cardinal and comparable across individuals. All respondents reported their level of
happiness, ℎ𝑖 , based on their experienced utility. Reported happiness for individual 𝑖, ℎ𝑖 ,
is given by
8

ℎ𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖

(1)

Equation (1) shows that in order to generate an answer to a happiness question,
individual 𝑖 applies an idiosyncratic, strictly increasing, and linear transformation 𝑣𝑖 to 𝑢𝑖 .
Following Clark and Oswald (1996), the estimation function is the following:
ℎ𝑖 = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽1 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜇𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜇𝑖 + 𝝆𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖
𝜖𝑖 = 𝜀𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖

(2)

(3)

where 𝑦𝑖 is individual-level reported annual income, and 𝜇𝑖 is the average level of annual
income of the reference group for individual 𝑖. 𝑋𝑖 is a set of control variables for individual
𝑖 . 𝜖𝑖 is the usual error term, which is assumed not to be correlated with explanatory
variables.
Deriving the income effects (4) is straightforward.
𝑀𝑈𝑅𝑖 =

∂ℎ𝑖
= 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖
∂log𝜇𝑖

(4)

Equation (2) is estimated using fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) showed that estimation results using OLS or ordered
probit were not significantly different from each other. To give a more comprehensive
result, ordered probit estimations are also provided as one robustness check. To interpret
the results, when the average of others’ income increases by 10 percent, individual 𝑖’s own
utility level will fall by – (𝛽2 + 𝛽3 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 )/10 point(s).2

2

For an individual experiencing a 10% percent increase of the average income of his reference group (from 𝑌1 to 𝑌2 ), his utility level

will decrease (in absolute value) by (𝛽2 + 𝛽3 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 ) × (log(𝑌2 ) − log(𝑌1 )) = (𝛽2 + 𝛽3 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 ) × log
(𝛽2 + 𝛽3 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 )/10.

𝑌2
𝑌1

= (𝛽2 + 𝛽3 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 ) × log(1.1) ≈
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The coefficient of interest is 𝛽3, which is the coefficient of the interaction term of
own income and reference income. If the relative income effects depend on one’s own
income, then 𝛽3 is statistically significantly different from zero. Otherwise, it concludes
that the relative income effects are homogeneous. Further, if 𝛽3 is negative, the relative
income effects are downwards asymmetric, implying high-income earners have higher
relative income effects than low-income earners. If 𝛽3 is positive, the effects are upwards
asymmetric, implying the poor have stronger relative income effects.

3. Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 The Life Satisfaction Variable
We estimate relative income effects from the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS), a longitudinal panel survey of households in Great Britain. The first wave of data,
including 10,000 people living in 5,500 households in 250 areas, was collected in 1991. A
panel dataset’s most important advantage is that it can mitigate the bias of the unobserved
individual-specific factors. For example, “very satisfied” for person A may be equal to
“fairly satisfied” for person B. Using a panel dataset and fixed effects estimation model,
we can rule out that bias.

10

Starting in 1996, a general question was included, “How satisfied are you with life
overall?” The answer serves as a proxy for individual utility level, 𝑢. Respondents choose
from 1 to 7, where 1 means “not satisfied at all” and 7 “completely satisfied.”3
The current study uses wave 12 to wave 18, a sub-sample across 7 years.4 Since wave
7, there is oversampling of low-income people. Following Distante (2013), observations
belonging to the original sample are kept to maintain random sampling. The panel provides
51,194 individual-year observations.
The self-reported subjective well-being (SWB) level is treated as a legitimate and
qualifying proxy of utility. Clark et al. (2008) argued that self-rated happiness and
satisfaction scores are reasonable measures of the economic notion of utility. 5 Although
economists tend to be skeptical about using the SWB level, it seems unlikely that human
happiness can be interpreted without considering what humans say.

3.2 Own Income and Relative Income
Because we are interested in how others’ income affects own satisfaction and how
that magnitude depends on own income, own income and relative income are the two most
important regressors in this analysis.

3

Respondents chose this answer based on their perceived quality of life. To help them better perceive, before this key question, the
survey included a couple of questions concerning different areas of life.
4
The life satisfaction question appeared since wave 6 but paused on wave 11. To have a series of continuing years, all waves after
11 are chosen.
5
Lepper (1998) and Sandvik et al. (1993) also adopted this view.
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BHPS provides annual pre-tax income for each household. 6 In the current study, all
income variables take the form of natural log and are deflated with 2005 as the base year
to adjust for inflation.
In the large body of literature exploring the relative income hypothesis, there is no
agreement on the definition of own income. Generally, studies have used adjusted average
household income (i.e., Layard et al., 2008). In the current study, we use weighted average
household income as the benchmark scenario. The weighted average household income is
constructed using the total household annual income divided by the household’s OECDmodified equivalence scale. 7 Within each household, the weighted average household
income is equally distributed on each member. Another robustness check is run using the
household income instead of weighted average household income.
According to Layard (1980), people can have different reference groups. They can
choose individuals with whom they are locally close or people with similar demographic
characteristics; or they may just compare with everyone else at a similar income level. How
to define reference income is a contentious issue, and several approaches exist in the
literature. Specifically, there is no consensus on the definition of reference group. Some
simply select residents based on their primary residence’s geographical area (Easterlin,
1995); some at first select residents based on geographical area, then refine by interacting
geographical proximity with other dimensions (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). Most previous

6

In BHPS, annual total household pre-tax income is the sum of annual labor and non-labor pre-tax income.

7

Weinzierl (2006) also adopted this equivalence scale. This scale “assigns a value of 1 to the household head, of 0.5 to each additional
adult member and of 0.3 to each child” (http://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/OECD-Note-EquivalenceScales.pdf).
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studies have divided the population into a number of different cohorts based on, age,
region, and some other demographic variables. Once the cohorts are established, each
person’s relative income is the cohort’s average income. In the current analysis, we choose
a reference group for each individual in the sample that is the group of individuals within
the same region8 and of similar ages, resulting in thousands of reference groups across the
sample. Finally, consistent with previous studies, the reference group was assumed to be
exogenous.
3.3 Control Variables
Dolan et al. (2008) provided a summary of factors associated with subjective wellbeing. Based on their results and recent literature, we choose a number of variables as the
current study’s regressors.
Age is found to be consistently related to SWB. Some studies show quadratic age
may matter (for example, Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). In the current analysis,
however, we consider only linear age.9
Health status is also confirmed to substantially affect SWB (Distante, 2013). In
BHPS, respondents are asked about their health status through the following question:
“How would you define your health status over the last 12 months?” The answer varies
from 1 to 5 where 1 means excellent and 5 means very poor. Following Distante (2013), to

8
In the BHPS survey, respondents are classified into 19 demographic areas, such as Inner London, Outer London, East Anglia, East
midlands, Greater Manchester, and Wales.
9
We test an alternative estimation function, which includes age-squared, and find that the coefficients on other variables don’t vary
much and the coefficient on age-squared is not significantly different from zero.
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construct a binary variable, we create a health status indicator equal to 1 when respondents
choose 1 or 2, and 0 otherwise.
Marriage is another control variable in this analysis. Studies show that being alone
appears to negatively affect SWB; therefore, we create a dummy to separate those who live
by themselves from others. Specifically, this binary variable equals one if the respondent
chooses “married” or “living as couple” and equals zero if he chooses “widowed,”
“divorced,” “separated,” or “never married.”10
Employment status is another control variable that affects life satisfaction. The
binary variable equals one if the respondent has a job with payment when interviewed and
equals zero otherwise.
Education levels are also important determinants of satisfaction, but the dataset limits
our ability to control for them due to a high rate of missing data.11 Finally, we also include
year and region dummies.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics and the distribution of responses for the
dependent variable. This table shows that among the respondents, few choose extreme
values when asked about their life satisfaction level overall. During the 7 years from wave
12 to wave 18, the distribution of seven levels of life satisfaction is fairly stable. For each

10
11

From now on, “married” means this marriage status indicator is equal to one; “not married” means this indicator is equal to zero.
Gender and race are not included because they are constant over time.

14

year, at least 64 percent chose 5 and 6 combined, and between 75-79 percent of the people
surveyed define themselves as very satisfied.12 Consistent with the Easterlin Paradox, there
is little change in the reported life satisfaction as the average income level increases.
Table 1.2 provides descriptive statistics for different income definitions used in the
regressions. The primary focus is on two types of income definitions: household income
and weighted average household income with OECD-modified equivalence scale. As for
the reference group, we use two different construction methods. First, we construct
individual-specific cohorts for every person observed in this sample, thus allowing every
person observed in the dataset to have his own reference group. To be selected in one
person’s reference group, the candidate has to satisfy three conditions: 1) the data came
from the same year; 2) they came from the same region; and 3) the age difference between
them is less than or equal to five years. The reference group’s income level is the average
income of all qualified candidates. Second, we follow most previous studies which defined
reference groups by dividing the whole population into a number of cohorts based on
region and age. 13 This method’s disadvantage is that two agents who have similar ages that
are close to any age threshold will not necessarily compare with each other. However, in
real life, they probably should. For that reason, building a reference group for everyone is
preferable. This approach is a process simulation in which every individual compares their
income to all qualified individuals.

12

Very satisfied is defined as answering 5, 6 or 7.

13

Several studies are exceptions. They regress the actual income on a list of determinants and use the predicted income level to
represent a person’s reference income level. (see, for example, Luttmer, 2005)
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Table 1.2 shows that those standing at a relatively more advantageous position in
society have moderately higher life satisfaction, regardless of how the reference group is
constructed and how the income variable is defined. T-tests are also performed under
different settings; and for all situations, we can reject the null hypothesis that the
conditional means of life satisfaction are equal without regard to how the individual’s
income compares to the reference group’s average income.
Table 1.3 provides descriptive statistics for the control variables used in the
regression. More importantly, it also provides the conditional mean life satisfaction level
based on each binary control variable and the results of t-tests, which accesses whether the
life satisfaction’s mean for the two groups is significantly different separately for each
binary variable. Table 1.3 shows that all three control variables (health status, employment
status, and marriage status) have positive and significant correlations with life satisfaction,
as expected. The mean life satisfaction is significantly higher when the individuals are
healthy, employed, and/or married.

4. Estimation Results
The benchmark scenario adopts the weighted average household income using the
OECD-modified scale. The benchmark scenario’s result is shown in Table 1.4. Column 1
is the estimation results when only the absolute income level is included. In column 2, the
reference income is added as an additional explanatory variable. In column 3, interaction
between own income and reference income is added. The first column clearly illustrates
that the own income level has no effect on satisfaction. This finding is consistent with some
previous studies (i.e., Easterlin, 1974; Boyce et al., 2010). Column 2 shows that after
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reference income is included, absolute income’s effect is still zero. However, reference
income has a significant and negative effect on life satisfaction, suggesting that others’
income is a much more important factor in determining one’s own happiness level than
own income. The results can be interpreted as follows: whenever the average income level
of one person’s reference group increases by 10 percent, that person’s life satisfaction level
goes down by 0.021 point on the 7-point scale.
Next, in column 3, the coefficient of the interaction term is significant and positive.
As own income rises, reference income’s effect on satisfaction decreases (in absolute
value). This finding implies that the relative income effect is heterogeneous within the
population; generally, the wealthy have smaller relative income effects than the poor.14
Figure 1.1 depicts the relative income effects at various levels of own income. It
demonstrates the heterogeneity of relative income effects across the population, varying
significantly depending on an individual’s own income level. The individual at the 5th
percentile of the income distribution has a relative income effect roughly three times as
large as that of the individual at the 95th percentile. Formally, 𝑀𝑈𝑅 = −1.141 + log(𝑦) ×
0.097. If a person is at the 25th percentile of the income distribution (10976.1), when the
income level of his reference group decreases by 10 percent, his life satisfaction level rises
by 0.02386 point on the 7-point scale. However, if he is at the 75th percentile of the income
distribution (24656.1), that rise shrinks by one-third to only 0.01601 point on the 7-point

14

Because relative income effects are jointly determined by the coefficients of reference income and interaction term, we run the
joint significance test on own income with interaction term and reference income with interaction term. The results of the joint
significance test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly equal to zero.
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scale. Recall that the relative income effect is 0.0211 when no interaction term is included.
In conclusion, with the interaction term, the relative income effect ranges from 0.00637 to
0.04014. It clearly shows that without the interaction term, we cannot capture relative
income effects’ true form, but only an average level.
This study is also interested in the coefficient of own income. Column 3 shows that
after adding the interaction term, the coefficient on own income becomes significant.
However, own income has a negative effect on satisfaction, and that effect is lower (in
absolute value) as reference income rises, suggesting that the lower the income people have,
the lower satisfaction they report. As income of the reference group surrounding that
person increases, the more likely he is to report higher satisfaction. Figure 1.2 depicts the
own income effects at various levels of relative income. Specifically, own income’s effect
on satisfaction becomes zero when reference income equals 17556.86. For two-thirds of
the people studied in the present analysis, their reference income is above that threshold
and an additional dollar of income translates to more happiness for them.
Finally, across three columns, the control variables show consistent findings. As age
rises, people become less happy. The coefficients on health status, marriage status, and
employment status are as expected. Respondents tend to be happier if they are healthy,
married, or employed.15

15
Recall that the health indicator is from a question asking the survey respondents to evaluate his or her health status. To avoid any
potential bias caused by the endogeneity issue from subjective evaluation, this study follows Distante (2013) and uses an alternative
control variable “Limits in Activities of Daily Life (ADL).” This alternative is a binary indicating whether the respondents think their
health conditions limit a certain list of daily activities. The estimation results show that replacing the subjective health status indicator
with an objective one affects neither the coefficient nor significance level.
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4.1 Robustness Check
In this section, the estimation results’ robustness is evaluated in several ways.
The first column of Table 1.5 is benchmark scenario’s estimation results. First, the
weighted average household income is replaced with household income and show the
estimation results in column 2 of Table 1.5. Given the highly intensive correlation between
household members, we believe that the whole family income possibly matters, instead of
individually weighted average household income. All control variables remain constant for
comparison. Correspondingly, the reference group is constructed the same as above, except
that we use household income instead. The results reported in column 2 of Table 1.5 are
consistent with those discussed above. The reference income has a significant and negative
effect on satisfaction. More importantly, the interaction term is significant and positive,
again illustrating that relative income effects are heterogeneous within the population.
Second, the benchmark scenario’s result is also tested for validity when using the
traditional method to construct the reference group. Compared with the benchmark case,
the current scenario still uses the weighted average household income with OECD
modified scale. However, the whole population is divided into several dozen cohorts.
Specifically, we divide the population into different cohorts based on region × age. This
dataset contains 19 different regions, and agents within each region are divided into the
following age groups: 15-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, and above 55 years old. This generates
19 × 5 = 95 different cohorts. Each person takes the average income level of the cohort he
belongs to as the reference income level. Column 3 of Table 1.5 reports the estimation
findings, which are mostly consistent. The coefficient of reference income alone is slightly
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less significant than previous scenarios. This finding can be explained by the reference
groups’ poor construction: some reference groups leave out some individuals who should
belong there, such as those whose ages are near any age threshold. Finally, after adding the
interaction term, the reference income has a significant and negative influence. Meanwhile,
the interaction term is positive and significant, indicating that the relative income effects
are heterogeneous and decreasing as own income increases.
Third, one year’s data is used to perform a cross-section analysis to test whether
using an ordered probit model yields similar findings. Table 1.6 shows the results.
Consistent with the benchmark case, the income variable was the weighted average
household income with OECD-modified scale, and the individual-specific cohorts
constructed using the same criteria as before are used. The interaction term between own
income and reference income is not significant in some waves although the coefficient’s
sign is usually consistent with the benchmark results (except for wave 14). This finding
shows that by regressing the whole sample with all the years, an average effect of relative
income effects across seven years is obtained, significantly dependent on the own income
level. Treating the utility proxy as ordinal or cardinal does not significantly affect the
results.

5. Conclusions
Since the “Easterlin Paradox” was discovered, many studies interested in the
relationship between income and happiness have found that it is not, at least primarily, our
own income that determines our reported well-being. Our study contributes to this growing
body of literature, this study has found that after controlling for a series of control
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variables, the absolute income’s effect has a negligible effect on happiness. Just as the
Easterlin Paradox suggests, this finding may explain why many countries’ subjective wellbeing levels did not increase as GDP levels increased during recent decades.
Furthermore, we explore the role of relative income. Previous studies in this area
have focused on either homogenous or uniformly asymmetric relative income effects. This
study takes a different approach and assumes relative income effects are heterogeneous
within the population. The interaction term is used to explore the dependence between own
income and reference income. Consistent with previous work, reference income has a
negative effect on life satisfaction. In addition, our results show the absolute income level
not only influences the well-being level directly, but also affects reported life satisfaction
indirectly through reference income; it changes the relative income effect’s magnitude. As
the absolute income level increases, the magnitude of relative income effect decreases (in
absolute value). This result is consistent with some studies which support Duesenberry’s
claim that relative income effects are upwards-asymmetric, meaning the wealthy are not as
competitive as the poor. However, this income-dependent relative income effect is more
general.
The field of relative income hypothesis is a young and growing field. Relative
income effects are gradually accepted in many areas and generate non-negligible impact,
such as the optimal income taxation literature. Relative income effects create negative
externalities since each individual suffers from growth in others’ income. As a result,
exploring the true correlation between income and happiness can help in deriving a more
efficient optimal income tax system to adjust for the negative externalities. Our next step
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is to incorporate income-dependent relative income effects revealed in the current analysis
into an optimal nonlinear income tax model.
In the current study, we make a first step and find that own income affects the
relative income effect’s magnitude. Future research can explore nonlinearity’s potential,
such as quadratic-income-dependent relative income effects. Also, this study adopts the
income variable as the aggregation of labor and non-labor income. It is, however,
reasonable to expect agents may have different responses between relative labor income
and non-labor income. Exploring this potential heterogeneity could be intriguing. Further,
relative income effects’ heterogeneity may depend on not only own income level, but also
other variables, such as marriage or health status. That suggests two individuals with the
same income level may still have distinct relative income effects. A myriad of avenues are
available for pursuing heterogeneity’s true form.
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Appendix

Table 1.1 Dependent variable: descriptive statistics and percentage of responses by year
Life satisfaction

Proportion (%)
Wave 12

Wave 13

Wave 14

Wave 15

Wave 16

Wave 17

Wave 18

Not satisfied at all (1)

1.27

1.30

0.39

1.07

0.96

1.13

1.03

2

1.89

1.92

1.46

2.36

2.11

1.86

1.83

3

5.77

5.39

5.36

6.30

6.53

6.00

5.73

4

13.71

13.29

13.26

15.28

14.17

13.83

13.80

5

31.50

29.75

34.63

32.14

31.12

31.11

32.72

6

33.11

35.22

36.74

32.16

34.28

35.06

34.22

Completely satisfied (7)

12.75

13.13

8.16

10.69

10.84

11.01

10.67
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Table 1.2 BHPS descriptive statistics: income variables

Variable

Obs.

Mean

S.D.

Household income

51194 35626.17 25689.55

Weighted average household income

51194 19631.93 13844.89

Life satisfaction

51194 5.21

1.21

Life satisfaction if household income > average of the 21345 5.28

1.07

dataset*
Life satisfaction if household income > average in the 21464 5.32

1.09

reference group: cohort defined by region and age
Life satisfaction if household income > average in the 21467 5.33

1.09

reference group: individual-specific cohort
Life satisfaction if weighted average household income > 20455 5.29

1.06

average of the dataset
Life satisfaction if weighted average household income > 21238 5.32

1.08

average in the reference group: cohort defined by region
and age
Life satisfaction if weighted average household income > 21349 5.33

1.09

average in the reference group: individual-specific cohort
* We also test that there exists a significant difference between the mean of life satisfaction between ahead of
others and behind others. We test this hypothesis under different setting by varying the definition of own income
and reference group.
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Table 1.3 BHPS descriptive statistics: control variables

Variable

Observations Mean

S.D.

Age

51194

45.17

18.04

Health status

51194

0.71

0.45

Employ status

51194

0.67

0.47

Marriage status

51194

0.68

0.47

Life satisfaction if healthy

36351

5.43*

1.05

Life satisfaction if not healthy

14843

4.67

1.40

Life satisfaction if employed

34447

5.23

1.09

Life satisfaction if not employed

16747

5.16

1.43

Life satisfaction if married

34588

5.30

1.14

Life satisfaction if not married

16606

5.01

1.32

* We also test that there exists a significant difference between the mean of life satisfaction between healthy and
unhealthy; employed and unemployed; married and unmarried separately.
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Table 1.4 Life satisfaction estimation results: the benchmark case
Life Satisfaction

Life Satisfaction

Life Satisfaction

0.002

0.006

-0.948

(0.010)

(0.010)

(0.351)***

-0.211

-1.141

(0.057)***

(0.347)***

Own income(weighted average)

Reference income (average; individualspecific cohort)

Interaction term (own income × reference

0.097

income)
(0.036)***
Age

Healthy

-0.043

-0.042

-0.043

(0.019)**

(0.019)**

(0.019)**

0.286
(0.012)***

Married

0.251
(0.021)***

Employed

0.078
(0.017)***

_cons

6.659
(0.801)***

0.286

0.285

(0.012)***

(0.012)***

0.253

0.251

(0.021)***

(0.021)***

0.082

0.083

(0.017)***

(0.017)***

8.694

17.873

(0.974)***

(3.513)***

Time dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Region dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

R2

0.02

N

51,194

Joint significance of own income and interaction term
Joint significance of reference income and interaction term

0.02
51,194

0.02
51,194
F= 3.89
F= 10.46

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Figure 1.1 Relative income effects as a function of own income*

* Relative income effects are interpreted as the numerical decrease (increase) of utility on the 1-7 scale when
one’s reference income increases (decreases) by 10%.
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Figure 1.2 Own income effects as a function of relative income
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Table 1.5 Life satisfaction estimation results: alternative income definition and reference group construction
method
Benchmark

Own income

Reference income

Interaction term (own income × reference income)

Age

Healthy

Household

Age × region

income

cohorts

-0.948

-0.669

-0.794

(0.351)***

(0.307)**

(0.361)**

-1.141

-0.853

-0.826

(0.347)***

(0.302)***

(0.359)**

0.097

(0.029)**

(0.037)**

-0.043

-0.044

-0.043

(0.019)**

(0.019)**

(0.019)**

(0.012)***
0.251
(0.021)***
Employed

0.083

_cons

0.081

(0.036)***

0.285

Married

0.064

0.285

0.285

(0.012)***
0.251

(0.012)***
0.248

(0.022)***
0.083

(0.021)***
0.080

(0.017)***

(0.017)***

(0.017)***

17.873

15.639

14.792

(3.513)***

(3.262)***

(3.620)***

Time dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Region dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

R2

0.02

N

51,194

Joint significance of own income and interaction term
Joint significance of reference income and interaction term

0.02

0.02

51,194

51,194
F= 3.89
F= 10.46

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 1.6 Life satisfaction ordered probit estimation results: by wave

Life satisfaction

Own income(weighted
average)
Reference income
(average; individualspecific cohort)
Interaction term (own
income × reference
income)
Age
Healthy
Married
Employed
N
Region dummies

Wave Wave
12
13
-1.496 -1.143

Wave Wave Wave Wave
14
15
16
17
0.885 -0.827 -0.237 -0.722

Wave
18
-1.513

(0.772)
*
-2.512

(0.683)
*
-2.168

(1.389)

(0.766)

(0.792)

(0.823)

-0.276

-1.911

-1.358

-1.669

(0.803)
***
-2.466

(0.745)
***
0.157

(0.659)
***
0.125

(1.365)
-0.079

(0.776)
***
0.090

(0.766)
*
0.032

(0.796)
**
0.079

(0.778)
***
0.155

(0.079)
**
0.001
(0.001)
*
0.666
(0.027)
***
0.332
(0.027)
***
0.003
(0.032)

(0.070)
*
0.002
(0.001)
***
0.684
(0.027)
***
0.304
(0.028)
***
0.020
(0.032)

(0.140)

(0.078)

(0.080)

(0.083)

-0.001
(0.001)

0.000
(0.001)

0.663
(0.037)
***
0.364
(0.037)
***

8,053
Yes

7,900
Yes

4,924
Yes

0.620
(0.028)
***
0.331
(0.028)
***
0.069
(0.032)
**
7,756
Yes

0.002
(0.001)
***
0.711
(0.028)
***
0.317
(0.028)
***
0.056
(0.032)
*
7,733
Yes

0.001
(0.001)
*
0.703
(0.028)
***
0.299
(0.028)
***
0.068
(0.032)
**
7,547
Yes

(0.081)
*
0.003
(0.001)
***
0.706
(0.028)
***
0.314
(0.029)
***
0.101
(0.033)
***
7,280
Yes

(omitted)

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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CHAPTER II
OPTIMAL TAXATION IN THE PRESENCE OF
INCOME-DEPENDENT RELATIVE INCOME EFFECTS
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1. Introduction
Duesenberry’s (1949) relative income hypothesis says that an individual’s utility
depends not only on his absolute income level, but also on his relative income position in
society. An individual gains utility if his income exceeds the income of most members in
his comparison group and loses utility if his income falls below the income of most
members in the group.
This relative income hypothesis brings non-negligible consequences. Each rational
individual initially faces a work-leisure choice. With relative income effects, the additional
benefit of income leads to the over-supply of labor and under-consumption of leisure.
People work hard to stay ahead. Agents expect the utility loss caused by the deviation from
the work-leisure equilibrium to be compensated in the form of a utility gain from the
income comparison. Nevertheless, as all agents spend more time working, the income gap
will not shrink as much as they expect. The opportunity to exchange leisure for higher
income seems more attractive to individuals than to society as a whole. According to Frank
(2008), public policy should react to these consequences by using such tools as taxation.
Income tax can serve as a critical tool to affect labor-supply choices.
This paper discusses the impact of relative income effects within a standard optimal
income tax structure. The personal income tax is acknowledged to generate labor-market
distortions. The tax increases work’s relative price and can make individuals choose either
more or less leisure. While this ambiguity has traditionally been driven by the familiar
income and substitution effects, we interject another consideration: the possibility that
individuals might react positively or negatively to income growth within their reference
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groups. While prior studies (i.e., Clark & Oswald, 1996) have explored the impact of
symmetric relative income effects on individual labor supply and the optimal income tax
schedule, we extend the literature by investigating how agents respond under
heterogeneous relative income concerns and how those responses affect the optimal tax
schedule. Specifically, we allow for the possibility that relative income effects depend
critically on one’s own position in income distribution.
Asymmetric relative income effects, which have been supported by many empirical
studies (i.e., Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005), allow for the possibility that the disutility from
being behind is different from the utility from being ahead. Our approach allows the
asymmetry to vary with income, in that lower-income individuals are permitted to react
differently than higher-income individuals to relative income. Peng’s (2015) empirical
results support the notion that relative income effects vary with own income.
Using a standard utilitarian social welfare function, the present analysis offers strong
evidence regarding the optimal degree of marginal tax rates’ (MTRs) progressivity in the
presence of asymmetric relative income effects. With the relatively wealthy agents having
stronger relative concerns, the tax system becomes more progressive; otherwise it becomes
more regressive. Furthermore, compared to the scenario without any relative concerns,
allowing for homogeneous relative concerns results in a marginal tax rate increase for all
agents, while allowing for heterogeneous relative concerns raises marginal tax rates for
some and lowers marginal tax rates for the rest.
To illustrate this study’s general finding, consider a society that consists of two
individuals, A and B. A is a high-ability type and wealthy, while B is low-ability type and
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poor. Introducing relative income effects brings extra marginal utility returns from labor
(due to the comparison of incomes) and results in a more inelastic taxable income with
respect to marginal tax rates.16 With symmetric relative income effects, A and B have the
same (or similar) marginal return from income competition; and both types experience a
similar tax increase. However, if the wealthy agent A has a larger marginal return from
income comparison than B, his taxable income is much more inelastic. The government
then can apply a higher rate of tax increase on A than B without a sizeable loss of efficiency,
thus increasing the progressivity of the tax system. However, if the poor agent B has a
larger marginal return from income comparison than A, under the utilitarian social welfare
function, the government can apply a higher relative tax rate increase to B without
occurring a sizeable efficiency loss. This implies a lower degree of progressivity, or
possibly a regressive tax depending on the relative sizes of the marginal returns from
income comparison.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 displays the motivation
and some background details. Section 3 presents the optimal income tax model with
asymmetric relative income effects. Section 4 discusses numerical results. Section 5
concludes.

16

A simple proof is provided later in the model section.
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2. Motivation
McCormick (1983) proposes that Duesenberry’s theory of income comparison
depends on some notion of conspicuous consumption, expressed by Veblen (1899). Veblen
argues that some products are purchased not only because of their intrinsic values, but also
their function as a signal for social status. Agents are motivated to achieve a higher level
of conspicuous consumption than others. Individual utility is thus influenced by a desire
for social status as well as the consumption per se. Both Veblen and Duesenberry question
the traditional utility function, which only consists of absolute amounts of goods, services,
and leisure. A growing body of both empirical and experimental studies favors Veblen’s
and Duesenberry’s arguments that the relative component in the utility function has
important effects on individual’s well-being.17
There are obvious difficulties with applying Veblen’s theory in the design of optimal
tax policy, both in theory and in practice. Not all commodities are “conspicuous.” The ideal
correcting tax system that considers relative concerns should only involve conspicuous
consumption, such as luxury cars. Nevertheless, assigning marginal tax rates for each good
based on how well they confer status is difficult.18 Even if possible, the tax structures could
be extraordinarily complex with enormous administrative costs. Further, the same product

17

See Easterlin (1995, 2001), Clark and Oswald (1996), Solnick and Hemenway (1998, 2005), Tversky and Griffin (1991),
Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), Alpizar et al. (2005), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Luttmer (2005), McBride (2001), and Tran and
Zeckhauser (2012).
18
Corlett and Hague (1953) argued that the goods that are relatively more complementary to the untaxed good (leisure) should be
applied to higher tax rates. A similar conclusion arises here in that the goods that are more complementary to the untaxed good (social
status) should also have higher tax rates.
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may be valued heterogeneously across the population. The idea of individual-specific
commodity tax rates is not attractive from a practical policy perspective.
In contrast, Duesenberry considered that by income comparison individuals receive
extra utility or disutility. This theory is therefore more suitable for consideration within an
optimal income taxation framework. The government would only need consider the
incentives based on income comparison through income-varying tax rates. The concept of
variable marginal income tax rates has enjoyed broader public support in many countries
than item- or person-specific commodity tax rates.
Some papers have incorporated relative concerns into the modern optimal tax design
founded by Mirrlees (1971) (Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Oswald, 1983; Tuomala,1990;
and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2008). All considered the case in which e relative
income effects are symmetric among the population (i.e., cases in which the utility from
being ahead by some amount is equal in absolute value terms to the disutility of being
behind by the same amount). These studies have suggested generally higher marginal tax
rates in the presence of symmetric relative income effects, but the impact on progressivity
is not substantial. Some studies also have used numerical simulations to explore the effect
of constant relative income effects on progressivity. Tuomala (1990) summarized his
findings as follows: “Other things being equal, marginal income tax rates are higher than
in the standard model when utility interdependence is assumed … we have to admit that it
does not reveal anything about the shape of the tax schedule” (p. 130). The present analysis
considers heterogeneous relative income effects and establishes a stronger prediction
regarding the optimal degree of progressivity.
39

If relative income effects are symmetric, income competing is a zero-sum game. The
disutility created by owning $100 less for one person is compensated by the utility created
by owning $100 more for another. This statement, however, does not apply under
heterogeneity. If individual A has larger concerns about relative income than individual B,
A’s owning more income generates a positive outcome from the income competition game.
Duesenberry (1949) stated that relative income effects can be asymmetric upwards.
In other words, the disutility from being behind by a certain amount exceeds the utility
from being ahead by the same amount. This statement is consistent with the idea that lowerincome individuals are aware of (and covet) higher social standing’s benefits (Solnick and
Hemenway, 1998). On the other hand, the relative income effects can also be asymmetric
downwards, consistent with the notion that those with higher standing are more eager to
maintain their relative position.
Many studies have employed econometric methods to look for evidence of
asymmetry. They have used a proxy for utility as the dependent variable and estimated the
marginal utility of some measure of a reference income level. Results from these studies
have lacked a general consensus. Some studies agree with Duesenberry, showing the
effects are indeed upwards asymmetric. For example, Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) analyzed
the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and found that West Germans have upwards
asymmetric relative income effects. Specifically, poor agents were negatively influenced
compared with their reference group, while rich agents did not feel happier from knowing
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their income was higher. Boyce et al. (2010) found similar results using the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS).19
In contrast, McBride (2001), using the U.S. General Social Survey (GSS) data,
revealed that the relative income concerns are in fact asymmetric downwards. In addition,
Mayraz et al. (2009) evaluated the GSOEP data and found the relative income effects are
symmetric, implying there is no difference between high- and low- income earners. 20
Given this lack of consensus, the current study evaluates the optimal tax schedules from a
more general form of heterogeneity in order to provide a general sense of the relationship
between relative income effects and tax schedule progressivity. Based on Peng’s (2015)
empirical work, we construct individual-specific relative income effects that either
positively or negatively depend on individuals’ own income levels.
Akerlof (1978) introduced some exogenous determinants into the optimal income tax
mechanism, improving the tax system’s reliability. He referred to these exogenous
characteristics as “tagging.” Several studies have shown the power of “tags.” Alesina et al.
(2011) considered gender-dependent taxation; Mankiw and Weinzierl (2010) argued
taxation should depend on height; and Weinzierl (2011) discussed the impact of
introducing age as an extra determinant. Although asymmetric relative concerns are not
really exogenous and should depend on each taxpayer’s relative income position in society,

19

A difference is that Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) found the relative income effect to be zero for high income earners; Boyce et al.
(2010) only found it smaller than that of low-income earners.
20
Mayraz et al. (2009) and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) found different results using the same dataset (GSOEP). The former let subjects
choose the reference group themselves while the latter defined the reference group as all agents at a similar education level, in the same
age bracket, and living in the same region.
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in the current analysis, we introduce them to correlate with exogenous wage levels under a
static model and to construct a series of individual-specific relative income effects
functioning in a similar fashion to Akerlof’s (1978) tagging. Moreover, tagging the
population based on their income is a more socially acceptable idea than other exogenous
pre-determined tags, such as gender or height.

3. The Model
This section presents the model used for numerical simulations. The modern optimal
income taxation framework was inspired by Mirrlees (1971). His model is a problem of
maximizing a social welfare function, subject to an aggregate budget constraint and an
incentive compatibility constraint. The only difference across agents is the ability level,
which is assumed to be equal to their hourly wage level.
Kanbur and Tuomala (2013) incorporated relative income concerns into Mirrlees’
(1971) framework. The current model is an extension of their work. For simplification
purposes, let us assume there is only one reference group that is the whole population; each
agent compares his own income level with the group’s average income level, which is the
population’s average income level. All individuals have the same reference income, which
is the whole population’s average income.
Kanbur and Tuomala allow for symmetric relative income effects. The current study
explores the optimal tax schedule under income-dependent relative income effects. A
critical question is how to represent income-dependency. Studies (e.g., Ferrer-i-Carbonell
2005) empirically testing asymmetric relative concerns have usually divided the population
into two categories: one whose income is higher than his comparison group’s and another
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whose income is lower than his comparison group’s. These studies assigned two different
𝜑 for these two categories. Upwards asymmetric relative concerns are confirmed if 𝜑 of
the category whose income is lower than the reference group’s is larger than 𝜑 of the other.
Upward asymmetry means that income comparison is mainly about comparing with people
who are wealthier than you. Downward asymmetry means mainly comparing with people
who are poorer than you. If each individual is comparing with the whole society, then the
richer he is, the larger chance he has that his income is higher than his reference group’s;
the poorer he is, the larger chance he has that his income is lower than his reference group’s.
Based on this spirit and Peng’s (2015) finding, we construct income-dependent relative
income effects that are broader than in prior work and that are also monotonically
correlated with agents’ own income levels.
In the current study, we assign each agent a unique 𝜑 as his/her relative income effect
to generate a continuous tax rate schedule. Denote agent ability (proxied by hourly wage)
as 𝑤; 𝑦 is labor supply (in percentage terms); 𝑤𝑦 is pre-tax income; and 𝑥 is disposable
income. The goal is to construct a series of individual-specific 𝜑 that is monotonically
correlated with individual’s disposable income 𝑥 . Due to incentive compatibility
conditions, for any two individuals 𝑖 and 𝑗, if 𝑤𝑖 > 𝑤𝑗 , we can have 𝑤𝑖 𝑦𝑖 > 𝑤𝑗 𝑦𝑗 and 𝑥𝑖 >
𝑥𝑗 . As a result, w is monotonically positively related with x. Thus, we generate qualified
relative concerns based on the exogenous w; agents’ relative concerns are associated with
their hourly wages. Intuitively, the relative income effect is more likely to be determined
by gross income, or productivity, which are more stable over time. The hourly wage rate

43

is a good indicator of gross income and productivity, however, and the model therefore has
legitimate and exogenous relative income effects.
This relative income concern is positively or negatively correlated with an
individual’s own income. Let
𝜇 = ∫ 𝑥(𝑤)𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤

(1)

denote the average income of the reference group (here it is the whole population’s average
income). The ability w has a density function f(w); w is on the interval (0,+∞).
The individual 𝑖 will maximize his utility subject to a budget constraint:
𝑥𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑇(𝑤𝑖 𝑦𝑖 ) + 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟

(2)

where 𝑇(𝑤𝑦) is the amount of tax paid based on the pre-tax income 𝑤𝑖 𝑦𝑖 ; 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟 is a
lump-sum transfer that is equal for everyone. The government cannot observe individuals’
abilities and thus is restricted to specifying taxes as a function only of earnings, 𝑇(𝑤𝑦).
Following the traditional utility function evaluated in the optimal taxation literature,
labor is the only income source. The agent 𝑖 maximizes his additive and separable utility
function as follows:
𝑥𝑖
𝑢𝑖 = log(𝑥𝑖 ) + 𝜑𝑖 log ( ) + log(1 − 𝑦𝑖 )
𝜇

(3)

where 𝑥𝑖 is 𝑖’s income, 𝑥𝑖 /𝜇 is the ratio of own income and reference income, and (1 −
𝑦𝑖 ) is leisure. Standard first order conditions are held: 𝑢𝑥 > 0, 𝑢𝜇 < 0, 𝑢𝑦 < 0. The second
inequality indicates that reference group’s increase of income level always hurts the agents’
utility.
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The second term of eq. (3) is the difference between the present model and the model
specified by Kanbur and Tuomala. They assume that for any two agents 𝑖 and 𝑗, 𝜑𝑖 = 𝜑𝑗 =
𝜑. The same relative concern applies to the whole population. In the current model, the
relative concern is a function of the individual i’s hourly wage, 𝑤𝑖 .
The last term of eq. (3) restricts the labor supply between 0 and 1. This restriction
potentially can bring some issues of locality to numerical results. Nevertheless, the
question of interest is how asymmetry affects the tax schedule. Thus, the results are still
valid as long as the above restriction exists for all cases evaluated, with and without
asymmetry.
To maximize own utility, each agent’s behavior satisfies the following:
(

1 + 𝜑𝑖
1 ∂yi
) 𝑤𝑖 (1 − 𝑡𝑖 ) −
=0
𝑥𝑖
1 − 𝑦𝑖 ∂xi

(4)

where 𝑡𝑖 is the marginal tax rate faced by individual 𝑖.
Eq. (4) implies that the marginal benefit of earning one more dollar for agent i is
𝑤𝑖 (1 − 𝑡𝑖 )(1 + 𝜑𝑖 )/𝑥𝑖 . Compared to the marginal benefit without relative income effects
𝑤𝑖 (1 − 𝑡𝑖 )/𝑥𝑖 , it is higher by 𝑤𝑖 𝜑𝑖 (1 − 𝑡𝑖 )/𝑥𝑖 . This increment represents income’s extra
marginal benefit brought by income comparison. Meanwhile, in eq. (4) income’s marginal
cost (benefit of leisure) remains the same as in a traditional framework. Agents thus engage
more in work and less in leisure. With symmetric relative income effects (e.g., Kanbur and
Tuomala, 2013), 𝜑 is homogenous across individuals. Income’s marginal benefit across
individuals at various income levels only differs by 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑡𝑖 , the absolute income amount
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and the marginal tax rate. With asymmetric relative income effects, the unique relative
concern 𝜑𝑖 also determines 𝑖’s income’s marginal benefit.21
Consistent with Kanbur and Tuomala (2013), the government maximizes the
utilitarian social welfare function,
∞

𝑆 = ∫ 𝑢(𝑤)𝑓(𝑤)𝑑 𝑤

(5)

0

Meanwhile, the social planner has revenue constraint,
∞

∫ 𝑇(𝑤𝑦)𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤 = 𝑅

(6)

0

where R is the total tax revenue. The tax revenue is distributed evenly to individuals in the
form of a lump-sum transfer. As a result, this is not a traditional revenue constraint in the
sense that no pre-determined revenue requirement exists. Tax revenue is purely for
redistribution purposes. This is equivalent to the notion that the government needs revenue
to fulfill its goal of providing a basket of public goods and services, which are assumed to
be equally valued by everyone.
For any individual 𝑖, totally differentiating utility with respect to 𝑤𝑖 , and making use
of (2), (3), and (4), the incentive compatibility constraint is as follows,

21

This footnote serves to explore the correlation between relative income effects and the elasticity of taxable income with respect
to marginal tax rates. We consider an individual i with no income effects who maximizes his/her utility: 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝜑𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 − 𝜇) +
𝑧
𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 − 𝑖 ), where 𝑧𝑖 is pre-tax income. It is easy to deduce that the elasticity of taxable income with respect to marginal tax rates
|𝜀𝑖 | =

𝑤𝑖

𝜏𝑖

. As the relative concern parameter increases, he/she becomes less elastic with respect to marginal tax rates.

[𝑤𝑖 (1+𝜑𝑖)(1−𝜏𝑖 )−1](1+𝜏𝑖 )
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𝑦𝑖 𝑉𝑦𝑖
𝑑𝑢𝑖
=−
𝑑𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑖

(7)

Eq. (7) ensures that agents will reveal true information about their ability levels. The
higher their ability, the larger the utility they will get.
Under the incentive-compatibility constraint, a marginal increase in public
expenditure is optimally distributed such that each agent’s utility rises by the same amount.
This is carried out by the lump-sum transfer and thus does not distort the labor supply
decision. The cost in consumption terms of raising utility marginally for agent 𝜃 is the
inverse of his disposable income’s marginal utility, 1/ (

1+𝜑(𝑤𝜃 )
𝑥𝜃

). The cost of an incentive∞

compatible marginal increase in average utility for the whole population is ∫0 1/
(

1+𝜑(𝑤𝜃 )
𝑥𝜃

) 𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃. 𝜆, the Lagrangian multiplier for the budget constraint (6), is the public

funds’ marginal value. It satisfies the condition below:.
𝜆=

1
∞
1 + 𝜑(𝑤𝜃 )
) 𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃
∫0 1/ (
𝑥𝜃

(8)

Following Kanbur and Tuomala (2013), the optimal marginal tax rates for agents at
each ability level are derived from the government’s maximization of (5) subject to
conditions (1), (6), and (7). After substituting using (8), the formula below is obtained:22

22

Kanbur and Tuomala (2013) provide details of the algebra behind this result.
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1 + 𝜑(𝑤𝑖 )
) ∞ (1 + 𝛾)
𝑡𝑖
𝛾
1 + 𝐸𝑖𝑢 (
𝑥𝑖
𝜆
= +[
][
][∫
𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃
1 + 𝜑(𝑤𝑖 )
1 − 𝑡𝑖 𝜆
𝐸𝑖𝑐
𝑤𝑖 𝑓(𝑤𝑖 )
(
)
𝑤𝑖
𝑥𝑖

∞

− (1 − 𝐹(𝑤𝑖 )) ∫
0

1

1 + 𝜑(𝑤𝑖 )
(
)
𝑥𝑖

𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃 ]

(9)

where 𝐸 𝑢 is the uncompensated elasticity of labor supply, 𝐸 𝑐 is the compensated elasticity
of labor supply, and 𝛾 is the Lagrange multiplier for constraint (1).
From the first order conditions, 𝛾⁄𝜆 is a constant term satisfying the following
equation,
∞ 𝜑
∫0 ( 𝜇 ) 𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤
𝛾
=
𝜆 1 − ∫∞ (𝜑) 𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤
0
𝜇

(10)

The benchmark scenario in this study is one in which the wealthy have higher relative
income effects (𝜑) than the poor. A concave utility of income means that income effects
are smaller for high-income earners, pushing marginal tax rates down at higher-income
levels. On the other hand, since the wealthy have larger relative income effects, they have
less elastic taxable income than the poor in response to a marginal tax rate increase to
maintain their relative position. Thus, a greater increase of marginal tax rates should apply
to the wealthy to take advantage of their relatively inelastic taxable income regarding
marginal rates, and a less intensive increase should apply to the poor because of their
relatively elastic taxable income. This suggests a higher degree of progressivity.
Collectively, these two forces determine the optimal tax rate schedule. Through numerical
simulations, the next section reveals these two opposing effects’ net impact on
progressivity’s optimal degree.
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4. Numerical Results
Due to the optimal tax formula’s complexity and a lack of data to inform the
appropriate choice of functional form for utility, scholars (e.g., Mirrlees 1971; Kanbur &
Tuomala, 2013) performed simulations to generate the optimal tax structure. In the current
study, Kanbur and Tuomala’s general numerical approach (2013) is used and the MTRs
are calculated using the above model. Heterogeneous relative concerns’ impact on the
optimal tax schedule is tested by replacing and comparing different relative income effect
components.
One major assumption concerns how to parameterize the wage distribution. Two
different distributions are widely used to describe the exogenous wage distribution (which
proxies for ability). Some (e.g., Mirrlees, 1971) assume a lognormal distribution, while
others (e.g., Diamond, 1998) consider a Pareto distribution. Saez (2001) found that the
lognormal distribution fits quite well for most income levels, but has an unrealistically thin
top tail. In contrast, the Pareto distribution fits well at the high end. Thus, in this study the
wage distribution is examined that has a lognormal distribution for most levels and a Pareto
distribution for the top tail (Mankiw et al., 2009).
4.1 Main Results
Based on eq. (7), individual i’s marginal utility of absolute income is (1 − τi )/𝑥𝑖
and marginal utility of relative income is (1 − τi )𝜑𝑖 /𝑥𝑖 . Some studies considering
symmetric relative income effects have found that the estimated coefficients on absolute
income and relative income have almost equal absolute values and opposite signs (e.g.,
Clark & Oswald, 1996; Luttmer, 2005). Thus, in the benchmark scenario, the population
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is assumed to span from an agent who has no relative concern to an agent who weights
relative income the same as absolute income.
In this scenario, the optimal marginal tax rates are calculated in three different cases,
which differ only in relative income effects, 𝜑. Case A is the traditional setting where
relative income effects do not play a role in the utility function and 𝜑 is zero for everyone.
Case B has a symmetric relative income effect and 𝜑 equals one for everyone.23 Case C,
which is our primary interest, contains heterogeneous relative income effects that
positively correlate with individuals’ wages. In Case C we assume that 𝜑 is increasingly
associated with the wage and has a uniform distribution, ranging from zero to one. 24
Specifically, the lowest-wage individual has 𝜑 of zero and the highest-wage individual has
𝜑 of one, with all other values of 𝜑 assigned along the uniform distribution from 0 to 1.
This is the simplest version of an income-dependent relative income effect. Case A and B
function as the lower and upper bounds for C, respectively. A summary of these three cases
is shown in Table 2.1.
Following Mankiw et al. (2009), the wage distribution is parameterized from CPS
data from March, 2007. The distribution is a modification of the lognormal approximation
in which a Pareto tail is included above the 95th percentile wage. Agents’ wage levels have
a range of [0.01, 500.51].25Adopting the algorithm discussed in Mankiw et al. (2009),26

23

This is the same 𝜑 that Kanbur and Tuomala (2013) evaluated.

24

To generate a range of [0,1] for the relative concern 𝜑 from the wage distribution [0.01, 500.51], the relative concern for agent 𝑖
is 𝜑𝑖 = 0.001998𝑤𝑖 − 0.00001998.
25
Some examples of the hourly wage levels accompanied by cumulative density functions are in the first two columns of Table 2.
26
Details are available online: http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/app/2304_Mankiw_Weinzierl_Yagan_appendix.pdf
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Table 2.2 presents the results for the lognormal-Pareto distribution. There are several
features of these results. First, at every wage level, the marginal tax rates (MTR) in case B
are higher than those in A. Consistent with previous studies (Kanbur and Tuomala, 2013;
Tuomala, 1990), we find that symmetric relative concerns are associated with higher
MTRs.
Second, Sadka (1976) and Seade’s (1977) famous end-point conclusion that the
marginal rate at the top income level is zero when the income distribution is bounded,
which we see in case A, no longer holds in the presence of relative income effects. This
result is also consistent with previous studies (Kanbur & Tuomala, 2013; Aronsson &
Johansson-Stenman, 2008). While providing a lower top marginal tax rate in order to elicit
effort from the highest earner remains desirable, the presence of relative income effects
allows the tax rate to be non-zero.
Third, marginal tax rates are extremely high at the bottom of the income distribution.
This feature (which is consistent with Mankiw et al., 2009) results mostly from efficiency
concerns and thus may be quite impractical. However, the U.S. earned income tax credit
(EITC) is a real-world example. Specifically, marginal tax rates become much higher as
the EITC phases out due to income growth.
Note that under heterogeneous relative concerns, the marginal tax rate 𝑡𝑖 will depend
on others’ relative concerns 𝜑−𝑖 as well. For example, the top-income earners in cases B
and C share the same hourly wage and relative concern (𝜑 = 1), but their MTRs are
different. The reason is that while all agents’ relative concerns are 1 in case B; in case C,
concerns of all except the top-income earner are less than 1. Thus, keeping his current
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status is harder for the top-income earner in case B than in case C. He has much stronger
motivations to keep working hard and will engage in more labor. The government can thus
apply a higher MTR to him without suffering a loss of efficiency.
Graphs are powerful to illustrate how progressive the tax structure is in each case.
Figure 2.1 depicts the tax schedules under all three cases. The bottom line is the curve for
case A (𝜑 = 0). The top line is the curve for case B (𝜑 = 1). The curve of case C (𝜑 ~ [0,1])
lies mostly in between. At the bottom of the wage distribution, case C’s curve converges
with case A’s; meanwhile at the top of the distribution, it converges with case B’s. This
reflects the fact that in case C, agents at the low-skill level have relative effects converging
with case A’s effects; agents at the high-skill level have relative effects converging with
case B’s effects.
A very important feature shown in Figure 2.1 is that when transitioning from case A
to case C, the heterogeneous relative income effects actually raise marginal tax rates only
for the extremely wealthy (for whom the hourly wage is larger than around $175/hour while
lowering marginal tax rates for the remaining majority. This consequence collectively
comes from two opposing effects. First, in case C, extremely high-income earners are less
distorted by high MTRs than in case A since they value their social status. This causes
them to engage more in labor supply; thus, they can face higher MTRs and pay more taxes
than in case A without an efficiency loss. Meanwhile, in case C the majority have smaller
relative concerns, but they still have more inelastic taxable income than in case A; thus,
the government should apply higher MTRs on them. Second, in case C the government
intends to apply lower MTRs on the majority because of the increment of tax revenue
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coming from the top-income earners. Taxing extremely high-income earners and then
distributing evenly as a lump-sum transfer would be more efficient, especially when their
taxable income is relatively more inelastic with respect to MTRs than low-income earners’.
The simulation results show that collectively, the majority’s MTRs slightly decrease,
confirming that in this heterogeneity environment, 𝜑−𝑖 plays an important role in deciding
MTRs. In case C, the majority enjoy lower MTRs only because of their more competitive
“neighbors.” This feature does not happen in case B because the majority do not differ from
the top-income earners on relative concerns. Thus, the second effect above is much smaller
and does not dominate the first effect. The government will try to use higher MTRs to
restrain the majority as well as the high-income earners.
In the literature, relative concerns are associated with MTRs’ universal increases.
However, Figure 2.1 shows that taking income-dependent relative income effects that are
positively related to own income into account – instead of symmetric relative concerns –
decreases MTRs for most agents and increases MTRs for extremely high-income earners.
This implies that if the rich do have larger relative concerns than the rest, efficiency
considerations dictate higher MTRs on them and then compensate the majority by lowering
their MTRs. Finally, under heterogeneity, the tax schedule’s progressive segment (where
MTRs increase as the wage level increases) is relatively longer, and the regressive segment
(where MTRs decrease as the wage level increases) is shorter. Evidently, the optimal
income tax structure is characterized by a greater degree of progressivity.
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4.2 Robustness Check
The benchmark scenario consists of three important assumptions: i) the wage
distribution is a combination of a lognormal distribution and a Pareto distribution; ii) the
utility increase mostly comes from increased absolute income rather than increased relative
income; and iii) the wealthy have larger concerns than the poor. Therefore, to reach a
comprehensive conclusion of how heterogeneous relative concerns affect the optimal
income tax structure, we conduct a series of robustness checks and separately replace these
assumptions.
Figure 2.2 shows the optimal tax structure involving a lognormal wage distribution
throughout the entire distribution.27 In all three cases, consistent with Mankiw et al. (2009),
MTRs are decreasing as the wage increases. After taking into account heterogeneous
relative concerns, only high-income earners suffer from increased MTRs, compared to the
traditional case. This again confirms the result above that if the relative income effects are
positively related to own income levels, MTRs only increase for the rich. Overall, this
alternate wage distribution removes the progressive segments, but the tax structure still has
a lower degree of regressivity of MTRs after introducing heterogeneous relative concerns.
In the benchmark scenario, 𝜑 is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1; thus, most
individuals derive more utility from absolute than from relative income. Anytime an
individual’s income is increased, up to half of the utility gain comes from income

27

This lognormal distribution is fitted from the same dataset – March 2007, CPS.
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comparison. Figure 2.3 illustrates tax curves under the alternative assumption. In this
scenario, 𝜑 is uniformly distributed between 0 and 4. Thus, 75% of agents benefit more
from relative rather than absolute income when facing income increases. All of the
benchmark scenario’s features are inherited. As 𝜑 increases for most agents, those features
become more dramatic. As opposed to the traditional case, most agents have lower MTRs
except the extremely wealthy group with heterogeneous relative concerns. The tax curve
representing heterogeneous relative concerns becomes more progressive again.
Next, evaluating the alternative assumption regarding relative income effects is
worthwhile. Figure 2.4 presents tax curves under the lognormal-Pareto distribution when
relative income effects are negatively related to own income. In this scenario, low- income
agents have large 𝜑, and high income agents have small 𝜑. As before, the curve that mostly
lies between represents relative income effects of upward asymmetry (𝜑 has a uniform
distribution among the agents, ranging from zero to one). This curve appears more
regressive instead. The other two curves represent the structures with symmetric relative
concerns and no relative concern from top to bottom, respectively. In this situation, lowincome earners have higher relative concerns and more inelastic taxable income with
respect to tax increases. On purely efficiency grounds, the low- income individuals need to
be taxed more heavily because of their relatively inelastic taxable income. However, highincome earners contribute much larger tax revenue than the rest. As a result, compared to
the tax curve under the traditional scenario, everyone suffers from a higher MTR in this
upward asymmetry scenario. The government cannot afford lower MTRs for the wealthy
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while raising MTRs for the poor. Taxing the rich to compensate the poor is easier than the
other way around.
Finally, we also incorporate Peng (2015)’s empirical evidence and deduct the optimal
MTRs. Figure 2.5 shows the result. Peng (2015) evaluates British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) and finds the poor have larger concerns regarding others’ income. For simplicity,
in figure 2.5, we assume the poorest person’s relative income effect is 0.85, the wealthiest
person’s relative income effect is 0, and the relative income effect still fits in a uniform
distribution among the population.28 The tax curve under this situation is close to the one
in figure 2.4, and it also becomes less progressive comparing to the curve with homogenous
relative income effects.

5. Discussion
This paper shows that allowing for relative income effects’ heterogeneity can
significantly affect optimal income tax rates as well as progressivity. While the selection
of wage distribution and whether absolute or relative income dominates do not play
important roles in deciding the progressivity degree, whether the effects are positively or
negatively related to own income is critical. Greater optimal progressivity arises as
wealthier taxpayers have stronger relative income effects. Given the specific type of
heterogeneity’s importance for optimal tax progressivity, additional empirical analysis is

28

In Peng (2015)’s study, the relative income effect has a uniform distribution on the natural logarithm of income. But here we
make an assumption for simplification purposes that the relative income effect has a uniform distribution on income.
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desirable to discover how individuals respond to reference-group income as own income
changes.
The income tax policy is always an important political topic. When designing an
optimal income tax system, an important concern is the equity-efficiency tradeoff. Most
countries around the world now have progressive income tax systems, which is primarily
based on the grounds of equity (Bos & Tillmann, 1985). In this analysis, we assume a
utilitarian social welfare function with no inequality aversion parameter. Thus, a generally
regressive tax schedule is justified on the grounds of efficiency (high-income earners
should be less distorted because of their high productivity). Thus, taxing the poor more
heavily makes sense when they are more sensitive to the income gap than the wealthy and
have a more regressive tax structure. From the social planner’s perspective, this tax system
is not designed for reducing income inequality. Instead, taxing the poor more heavily in
this situation is purely based on efficiency purposes.
The practical impact of relative income effects runs counter to the traditional
behavioral responses typically considered in optimal income tax models. Specifically,
taxable income’s elasticity with respect to marginal tax rates is known to be higher for
high-income taxpayers for a variety of reasons, including access to various opportunities
for manipulating income (Gruber & Saez, 2002; Saez et al., 2012). While this would
typically generate lower optimal marginal rates for higher-income taxpayers, considering
relative income effects can work in the opposite direction, thus supporting greater optimal
progressivity.
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This study considers relative income effects monotonically correlating with income
level. Future research should explore other possible forms of heterogeneous relative
income effects. At the extreme, relative income effects are likely individual-specific and
depend on a variety of factors (e.g., age, gender, marital status, religious background).
Indeed, two individuals with identical incomes may have very different views of the
reference group income’s importance. This individual-specific consideration also likely
transfers to our consideration of a universal lump-sum transfer; individuals are likely to
evaluate that transfer differently in a way that might or might not be correlated with income.
Numerous studies (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2013) have shown that agents may benefit
heterogeneously from public good provision.
Finally, examining how relative income effects vary across countries is also
important. For example, China has experienced rapid economic growth during the past
several decades, and an estimated 29% of the world’s luxury purchases in 2013 were made
by Chinese nationals—more than any other country.29 The extent to which this is indicative
of more substantial relative income effects, and the extent to which that information could
be used for welfare-enhancing policy, is worthy of additional research.

29

China Luxury Goods Market Study, Bain & Company, 2013.
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Appendix

Table 2.1 Summary of cases evaluated

Relative income effect

Min(𝝋)

Max(𝝋)

Case A

No effect

0

0

Case B

Symmetric effect

1

1

Case C

Heterogeneous effect

0

1
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Table 2.1 Numerical results of lognormal-Pareto distribution

Case A (𝝋 = 𝟎)

Case B (𝝋 = 𝟏)

X
w(wage)

F(w)

Case C (𝝋 ∈ [𝟎, 𝟏])

X

L

X

L
(disposable

MTR

(labor)

L
(disposable
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(labor)
income)

(disposable
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income)

income)
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0
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Figure 2.1 Tax structure for lognormal-pareto distribution (benchmark)
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Figure 2.2 Tax structure for lognormal distribution
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Figure 2.3 Tax structure for lognormal-pareto distribution, relative income effects dominate
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Figure 2.4 Tax structure for lognormal-pareto distribution, the poor have larger concerns
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Figure 2.5 Tax structure for lognormal-pareto distribution, evidence from BHPS
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CHAPTER III
OTHER REGARDING PREFERENCES AND INEQUALITY

71

1. Introduction
Traditional microeconomic models assume selfish motivations of economic agents
that drive decision-making. For individuals, this includes optimizing choices like labor
supply and consumption. As powerful as these models have proven to be, they cannot
explain certain behaviors that have been observed in market, social, and experimental
settings. For example, individuals give more to charity, comply more with the tax system,
and transfer more of their endowment in dictator games than standard theory would predict.
While economists have long recognized that individuals have various tastes for fairness
that may help explain these and similar behaviors, formal modeling is a relatively recent
phenomenon.
In the realm of fiscal policy and redistribution, selfish preferences have similarly
dominated modeling. Issues of equity and fairness have typically been imposed by positing
social welfare functions that capture tastes for redistribution, often with the companion
assumption of declining marginal utility of income. In classic optimal tax applications
without lump-sum redistribution, these preferences are then balanced against the
tax/transfer system’s efficiency consequences yielding the familiar equity-efficiency
tradeoff. Such optimal tax models generally offer no organic mechanism for eliciting
underlying individual preferences for redistribution.
Notions of fairness and equity have been introduced formally into several modern
constructs of individual preferences falling under the general headings of social or otherregarding preferences. These alternative formulations of preferences are being used to
better understand fiscal policy choices and their consequences, including the degree of
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redistribution the tax/transfer system imparts. One important class of models considers
positional goods (like extravagant yachts or large personal estates) where utility depends
on own consumption relative to the average consumption of society or some reference
group. 30

Status-seeking agents are willing to expend resources to increase their

consumption relative to the reference group in order to increase utility, while more
consumption by the reference group diminishes the status-seeking agent’s utility. These
models have important and often novel implications. For example, Wendner and Goulder
(2008) show that consumption taxes can be efficiency enhancing by reducing taxation’s
marginal excess burden in the presence of positional goods as taxes diminish the pursuit of
status.31
This analysis is built on a closely related class of models capturing preferences for
inequality aversion. Examples include Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000). Like models of positional goods, own utility with other-regarding preferences
depends in part on other economic agents’ consumption or utility. However, models of
inequality aversion allow for more general forms of utility interdependency. For example,
an agent may be averse to being ahead of others in income or consumption distribution or
be competitive and derive utility from being ahead. Similarly, agents may be averse to
themselves or others being behind in income or consumption. This allows for a more

30

Examples include Easterlin (1995), Ireland (2001, 1998), Allgood (2006) and Wendner and Goulder (2008). For an introductory
survey, see Hopkins (2008).
31
This application has some similarity to that of Feldstein (1972) who considered distributional equity in the context of the Ramsey
rule. However, consistent with the optimal tax literature of the era, Feldstein imposed a social welfare function that is a weighted
average of household marginal utility.

73

flexible model than what might be called “classic models” of behavior, where labor supply
and consumption decisions are simply based on the population’s average consumption.
As Hopkins (2008) pointed out, inequality-averse preferences are usually observed
in experimental economics while competitive preferences dominate empirical evidence
from surveys. This observation signifies the necessity of considering both while modeling
human behavior. Prior literature either considers only inequality averse preferences (e.g.,
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or competitive preferences (e.g., Ireland, 2001). Some studies
categorized competitive preferences based on whether you are ahead of or behind your
reference group. However, they did not involve inequality aversion. Our study takes a step
beyond by evaluating a broader form of other-regarding preferences.
We specify a model that allows inequality aversion as well as competitive
preferences where the government collects taxes through a linear income tax and then
redistributes evenly. The agents are differentiated by their endowed skill levels, which in a
competitive labor market yields a wage equal to the value of each agent’s marginal product
of labor. The agents are assumed to be other regarding in the sense that the consumption
of other agents affects own utility levels. The baseline analysis is the total output and degree
of income inequality for a simple economy with standard (myopic) agents. We compare
these outcomes against alternative models with other regarding preferences. By allowing
agents to view the consumption of those who are ahead differently than those who are
behind and the existence of both competitive and inequality-averse preferences, we find
including inequality-averse preferences can cause some significantly different outcomes
For example, many studies (e.g., Frank, 2008) suggest that these non-traditional
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preferences cause more labor supply. Our study shows that the effect on labor-supply
decisions is complicated when concerning inequality-averse preferences. This directly
leads to the complexity of the effect on total tax revenue collected for redistribution.
Further, we also explore the consequence on social inequality.

2. The Model
All agents have identical preferences, although they have differing productivity
levels and exogenous incomes. Let C denote consumption and L denote the supply of
Labor. An individual’s productivity, w, is also the wage rate (the composite good is
produced according to a CRS technology that uses L as the sole variable input). Labor
income is taxed at rate τ and all individuals receive a lump sum subsidy S. Agent i receives
direct utility from the consumption of leisure and the composite good.
Agents differ in their skill levels which are distributed on the interval [𝑤, 𝑤]
according to cumulative distribution H(w) with corresponding density h(w). Let the
consumption of an agent with skill level w be denoted by C(w), where we have suppressed
the other factors, such as the tax rate and subsidy, affecting an agent’s consumption choice.
Meanwhile, consumption C has a corresponding distribution G(C) determined by
skill levels. For the moment, we simply assume that the consumption and leisure choices
are normal so that C(w) and λ(w) are increasing in skill levels, other things equal. For a
given tax policy, an agent 𝑖 with skill level 𝑤𝑖 chooses 𝐶𝑖 to maximize:
U(𝐶𝑖 , ∙) = 𝐶𝑖 −

𝐶𝑖
[𝐶𝑖
𝛼 ∫𝐶(𝑤)

− 𝑧] 𝑔(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 –

𝐶(𝑤)
𝛽 ∫𝐶 [𝑧
𝑖

− 𝐶𝑖 ] 𝑔(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 −

𝐶𝑖 −𝑆 𝜎
)
(1−𝜏)𝑤𝑖

𝜉∙(

𝜎

where we substitute labor 𝐿 from 𝐶𝑖 = (1 − τ)w𝑖 𝐿𝑖 + 𝑆.
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The 𝛼 term reflects the utility/disutility an agent receives from being ahead of others
in the population, while the 𝛽 term reflects the magnitude of the disutility from being
behind.32 We do not generally restrict the sign of 𝛼. A positive 𝛼 indicates that agents are
inequality averse, while a negative 𝛼 indicates that agents are competitive. Throughout we
assume 𝛽 > 0 implying that agents do not like being behind others in consumption. We
also assume 𝛼 ∈ [−𝛽, 𝛽], which implies that competitive agents dislike being behind at
least as much as they enjoy being ahead (when α < 0, −α < β)33, and that all inequality
averse agents, including those the highest income, prefer more consumption to less (when
α > 0, α < β). Note that this utility specification implicitly assumes that the agent would
be indifferent to any permutation of consumption levels across other agents. That is, there
is an anonymous nature to the other regarding preferences.

3. Results
3.1 Labor Supply Effects
The necessary first-order condition for the utility maximizing consumption is given
by.
𝐶𝑖

𝐶(𝑤)

1 − α ∫ 𝑔(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 + β ∫ 𝑔(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 −
𝐶(𝑤)

32

𝐶𝑖

𝜉 ∙ (𝐶𝑖 − 𝑆)𝜎−1
=0
[(1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑖 ]𝜎

In the current analysis, we consider a static model; in other words, the whole population shares the same 𝛼 and 𝛽.

33

Many empirical studies (e.g., Ferrer-i-Carbonell) support this idea called “upward asymmetry.” They find that agents feel worse
about being behind, but not as much as how much they feel better about being ahead.
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1 − α𝐺(C𝑖 ) + β(1 − 𝐺(C𝑖 )) −

𝜉∙(𝐶𝑖 −𝑆)𝜎−1
[(1−𝜏)𝑤𝑖 ]𝜎

=0

(1)

The assumption 𝛼 ∈ [−𝛽, 𝛽] guarantees that following second order condition is
satisfied:
−(α + β)𝑔(𝐶𝑖 ) −

𝜉∙(𝜎−1)(𝐶𝑖 −𝑆)𝜎−2
[(1−𝜏)𝑤𝑖 ]𝜎

<0

(2)

The second order condition ensures that a maximum consumption for individual
𝑖 exists . For any individual 𝑖 , 𝐺(𝐶𝑖 (𝑤𝑖 )) = 𝐻(𝐶 −1 (𝐶(𝑤𝑖 ))) = 𝐻(𝑤𝑖 ) because
consumption level and skill level are monotonically correlated with each other.
Substituting this result into (1), we then have:
𝜉 ∙ (𝐶𝑖 − 𝑆)𝜎−1
= 1 − α𝐻(w𝑖 ) + β(1 − 𝐻(𝑤𝑖 ))
[(1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑖 ]𝜎

(3)

We can substitute labor and get the optimal labor supply:
1

(1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑖 {1 − 𝛼𝐻(𝑤𝑖 ) + 𝛽[1 − 𝐻(𝑤𝑖 )]} 𝜎−1
𝐿∗𝑖 = [
]
𝜉

(4)

Furthermore, we also can evaluate the impact on the elasticity of taxable income with
respect to tax rate. Straightforward algebra shows that this elasticity is

𝜏
(𝜎−1)(1−𝜏)

, which is

independent of the other-regarding parameters. Also worth noting is that although labor
supply’s elasticity is constant across the population, those other-regarding parameters as
well as each agent’s position in the skill distribution still affect the optimal labor supply
itself.
Proposition 1
(a) For any given 𝑤, a competitive agent (α < 0, β > 0) provides more labor than a
self-interested agent.
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𝛼

(b) Suppose agents are inequality averse (α > 0, β > 0), and let ϕ = . A 𝑤
̃∈
𝛽

[𝑤, 𝑤] exists such that any agent i with skill level 𝑤𝑖 < 𝑤
̃ (> 𝑤
̃, resp.) provides more (less,
resp.) labor than a self-interested agent with the same skill level. Furthermore, 𝑤
̃(ϕ) can
be written as a decreasing function of ϕ such that 𝑤
̃(0) is the maximum wage level while
𝑤
̃(1) is the median wage level.
𝑤
̃ is the kink point for changes of optimal labor supply. As long as inequality-averse
agents increase (decrease, resp.) their labor supply, they gain from the decreasing gap with
agents that are ahead of (behind, resp.) them while losing from increasing the gap with
agents that are behind (ahead of, resp.) them. Only at this kink point 𝑤
̃ do these two
opposing effects on own utility level balance each other. As a result, for anyone whose
hourly wage is less than 𝑤
̃, the disutility he suffers from increasing his labor supply is
dominated by the utility he gains from increasing his labor supply, and vice versa.
Furthermore, increasing 𝛼 relative to 𝛽 decreases the kink point 𝑤
̃ , leading more
individuals to provide less labor at optimum. Decreasing 𝛼 means lowering the disutility
of being ahead so that more people suffer less from increasing their labor supply.
Last, 𝜙 = 0, α = 0 says each agent’s utility is independent from whomever is behind
him. Under this condition, everyone except the wealthiest suffer from comparing with the
people ahead. As a result, all agents except the wealthiest work harder to try to decrease
the gap. When 𝜙 = 1, α = 1, agents are equally averse to others ahead of and behind. For
any person lower than the median level, increasing his labor supply is advantageous since
he is behind more agents than he is ahead of; for any person higher than the median level,
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decreasing his labor supply is advantageous since he is ahead of more agents than he is
behind.
Simulations are run to illustrate our proposition. Our wage date is parameterized
from March CPS data of 2007, using a lognormal approximation. We follow Mankiw et al.
(2009) and assign several fixed parameters: Xi (ξ) =2.55; Tau (τ) = 0.35; Delta (σ) =3.
(Note that we use the same set of parameters for the following simulations, unless
specified.)
We illustrate the propositions developed above. Table 3.1 shows the optimal labor
supply at different skill distribution positions under several distinct sets of other-regarding
parameters.
It can been seen that compared with the selfish scenario (Benchmark), competitive
agents always provide more labor at the optimum (wherever the agent is at the skill
distribution, his optimal labor supply is higher if he is competitive instead of selfinterested); however, inequality-averse preferences make wealthy agents provide less labor
and make poor agents provide more. As Table 3.1 shows, if he is at the relatively low end
of skill distribution (H(w)=5%), inequality averse preferences increase his labor supply;
but if he is at the relatively high end of skill distribution (H(w)=82.71%), inequality averse
preferences decreases his labor supply.
3.2 Revenue Effects
The government uses tax revenue to fulfill its functions, such as providing public
goods or more redistributive transfer. In this scenario, the government returns the collected
taxes equally as a lump-sum transfer.
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Proposition 2
(a) For a given skill distribution and a given tax rate, competitive agents (𝛼 < 0, 𝛽 >
0) generate larger total tax revenue than self-interested agents. The society that consists of
competitive agents also produces more and has larger average consumption than that
consists of self-interested agents.
dα

(b) Define Ω = dβ. When agents are inequality averse (α > 0, β > 0)), for a given
skill distribution and a given tax rate, if Ω is sufficiently close to 1, the total tax revenue
and the average consumption are smaller than with self-interested agents; if Ω is
sufficiently close to 0, the total tax revenue and the average consumption are larger than
with self-interested agents.
(c) Tax revenue’s elasticity with respect to tax rates is a function of only the tax rate
and labor supply’s elasticity.
Proof of proposition 2(a):
𝑤

𝑤

(1−𝜏)𝑧{1−𝛼𝐻(𝑧)+𝛽[1−𝐻(𝑧)]}

Since S = τ ∫𝑤 𝑧𝐿(𝑧)ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 = τ ∫𝑤 𝑧[

𝜉

1

]𝜎−1 ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧, we have:

2−𝜎

𝑤

∂S
𝑧 (1 − 𝜏)𝑧{1 − 𝛼𝐻(𝑧) + 𝛽[1 − 𝐻(𝑧)]} 𝜎−1 (1 − 𝜏)𝑧
=τ∫
[
]
(−𝐻(𝑧))ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
∂α
𝜎−1
𝜉
𝜉
𝑤

<0

(10)

and
2−𝜎

𝑤

∂S
𝑧 (1 − 𝜏)𝑧{1 − 𝛼𝐻(𝑧) + 𝛽[1 − 𝐻(𝑧)]} 𝜎−1 (1 − 𝜏)𝑧
=τ∫
[
]
(1 − 𝐻(𝑧))ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
∂β
𝜎−1
𝜉
𝜉
𝑤

>0

(11)
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Clearly, tax revenue is a decreasing function of α and an increasing function of β.
For a given skill distribution and tax rate, competitive agents (𝛼 < 0, 𝛽 > 0) generate more
tax revenue than self-interested agents (𝛼 = 𝛽 = 0). Also, it follows from proposition 1(a)
that competitive agents’ increasing their labor supply leads to higher income for each than
for self-interested agents, and the society’s average consumption is larger under
competitive agents than under self-interested agents.
Proof of proposition 2(b):
Take total derivative of S, we can get:
𝑑𝑆 =

∂S
𝜕𝑆
𝑑𝛼 +
𝑑𝛽
∂α
𝜕𝛽

(12)

𝑑𝑆
2−𝜎

𝑤

(1 − 𝜏)𝑧{1 − 𝛼𝐻(𝑧) + 𝛽[1 − 𝐻(𝑧)]} 𝜎−1 (1 − 𝜏)𝑧
𝑧
= τ∫
[
]
(−𝐻(𝑧))ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 𝑑𝛼
𝜎−1
𝜉
𝜉
𝑤

2−𝜎

𝑤

𝑧 (1 − 𝜏)𝑧{1 − 𝛼𝐻(𝑧) + 𝛽[1 − 𝐻(𝑧)]} 𝜎−1 (1 − 𝜏)𝑧
+ τ∫
[
]
(1
𝜎−1
𝜉
𝜉
𝑤

− 𝐻(𝑧))ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 𝑑𝛽

(13)

dα

Given Ω = dβ, we can have:
2−𝜎

𝑤

𝑧 (1 − 𝜏)𝑧{1 − 𝛼𝐻(𝑧) + 𝛽[1 − 𝐻(𝑧)]} 𝜎−1 (1 − 𝜏)𝑧
𝑑𝑆 = τ ∫
[
]
[1 − (1
𝜎−1
𝜉
𝜉
𝑤

+ Ω)𝐻(𝑧)]ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 𝑑𝛽

(14)

When Ω = 0,
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2−𝜎

𝑤

𝑧 (1 − 𝜏)𝑧{1 + 𝛽[1 − 𝐻(𝑧)]} 𝜎−1 (1 − 𝜏)𝑧
𝑑𝑆 = τ ∫
[
]
[1 − 𝐻(𝑧)]ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 𝑑𝛽
𝜎−1
𝜉
𝜉
𝑤

>0

(15)

When Ω = 1,
2−𝜎

𝑤

𝑧 (1 − 𝜏)𝑧{1 − 𝛼𝐻(𝑧) + 𝛽[1 − 𝐻(𝑧)]} 𝜎−1 (1 − 𝜏)𝑧
𝑑𝑆 = τ ∫
[
]
(1
𝜎−1
𝜉
𝜉
𝑤

− 2𝐻(𝑧))ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 𝑑𝛽
2−𝜎

𝑤 𝑚𝑒𝑑

𝑧 (1 − 𝜏)𝑧{1 − 𝛼𝐻(𝑧) + 𝛽[1 − 𝐻(𝑧)]} 𝜎−1 (1 − 𝜏)𝑧
= τ ∫
[
]
(1
𝜎−1
𝜉
𝜉
𝑤

− 2𝐻(𝑧))ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 𝑑𝛽
2−𝜎

𝑤

(1 − 𝜏)𝑧{1 − 𝛼𝐻(𝑧) + 𝛽[1 − 𝐻(𝑧)]} 𝜎−1 (1 − 𝜏)𝑧
𝑧
+τ ∫
[
]
(1
𝜎−1
𝜉
𝜉
𝑤 𝑚𝑒𝑑

− 2𝐻(𝑧))ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 𝑑𝛽

(16)

From (16), the sign of 𝑑𝑆 is determined by two terms: the overall effect caused by
the population’s lower 50 percent and the population’s higher 50 percent. Since the higher
50 percent has larger optimal labor supply and pre-tax income than the lower 50 percent,
the second term should dominate the first. Finally, since the second term integrates over all
people above the median, it is negative. As a result, (16) < 0.
When Ω = 0, 𝑑𝑆 > 0 and when Ω = 1, 𝑑𝑆 < 0, a Ω must exist between 0 and 1 such
that 𝑑𝑆 = 0. In general, with inequality-averse agents, the total tax revenue’s aggregate
effect depends on the ratio of changes on α and on β. As the change on α becomes
82

relatively larger, the total tax revenue becomes more likely to be smaller than with selfinterested agents. As the change on α becomes relatively smaller, the total tax revenue
becomes more likely to be larger than with self-interested agents.
This proposition in fact reflects Proposition 1. Under inequality-averse preferences,
some increase their labor supply and some decrease, the overall effect on tax revenue will
no longer be strictly increasing or decreasing as in the competitive situation. This is because
tax revenue is an aggregate impact originating from the effects on labor supply.
Finally, we use simulations to numerically calculate the average consumption and
the average tax revenue under different settings to illustrate these propositions. Tables 3.2
and 3.3 show the average consumption and average tax revenue under different sets of α
and β. If both α and β increase in absolute terms while α is negative, people become more
competitive. As the society becomes more competitive, the average tax revenue
undoubtedly increases, as well as the average consumption.
However, when both α and β are positive, agents are inequality averse. Based on
proposition 2, the effects should be a bit more complicated. The starting point is where
𝛼 = 𝛽 = 0. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show that the average consumption under this scenario is
42.9402, and the average tax revenue under this scenario is 15.0291. First, if Ω = 0.5, then
𝑑𝛼 = 1/2𝑑𝛽. If agents become more inequality averse and 𝛼 rises to 0.1, β will increase
to 0.2, respectively. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show that the average consumption decreases to
42.2171 and that the average tax revenue under this scenario is 14.7760. This illustrates
half of proposition 2(b): when Ω is sufficiently large, the total tax revenue is smaller than
with self-interested agents, as well as the average consumption. Second, if Ω = 0.25, so
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𝑑𝛼 = 1/4𝑑𝛽. Let’s say α = 0.1, β = 0.4. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 then show that the average
consumption under this scenario is 43.1557 and that the average tax revenue under this
scenario is 15.1045. This illustrates the second half of proposition 2(b): when Ω is
sufficiently large, the total tax revenue and the average consumption are larger than with
self-interested agents..
Proof of proposition 2(c):
The elasticity of tax revenue is
𝜕𝑆

𝜏

1

𝑤

𝜀2 = 𝜕𝜏 ∙ 𝑆 = {∫𝑤 𝑧 [

𝑧∙{𝐴}
𝜉

ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧} ∙

(1−𝜏)𝑧∙{𝐴} 𝜎−1
] ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝜉

1
1
𝑤 (1−𝜏)𝑧∙{𝐴} 𝜎−1
]
ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
∫𝑤 𝑧[
𝜉

𝜏
(𝜎−1)(1−𝜏)

=1−

𝑤

1

1

+ 𝜏 ∙ ∫𝑤 (−𝑧) ∙ 𝜎−1 [

(1−𝜏)𝑧∙{𝐴} 𝜎−1−1
]
𝜉

1
1
−1
𝑤𝑧∙(1−𝜏)𝜎−1
𝑧∙{𝐴} 𝜎−1
𝜏 ∫𝑤
[
]
ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝜎−1
𝜉
1
𝑤 (1−𝜏)𝑧∙{𝐴} 𝜎−1
]
ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
∫𝑤 𝑧[
𝜉

∙

= 1−

(17)

This elasticity does not correlate with α or β.

∎

3.3 Degree of Inequality Effects
The simplest way to inspect a society’s inequality is to investigate the gap between
the wealthiest person and the poorest. In this study, we use the difference between the two
for illustration.
For an other-regarding agent with skill level w = 𝑤, his/her optimal labor supply is:
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤{1 + 𝛽} 1
] 𝜎−1
𝜉

𝐿∗𝑖 |𝑤=𝑤 = [

(18)

This says, for the other-regarding agent with skill level w = 𝑤, he always provides
more labor than a self-interested agent with skill level w = 𝑤. Also, it can be seen that
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∂𝐿∗𝑖 |𝑤=𝑤
∂α

= 0 and

∂𝐿∗𝑖 |𝑤=𝑤
∂β

> 0. This result is intuitive. For the lowest-skilled person, his/her

optimal labor supply is not affected by how much he/she cares about being ahead (since
he/she will always be the last), but is affected by how much he/she cares about being
behind. The larger disutility he falls behind creates the larger incentive he has for increasing
his labor supply.
For an other-regarding agent with skill level w = 𝑤, his/her optimal labor supply is:
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤{1 − 𝛼} 1
] 𝜎−1
𝜉

𝐿∗𝑖 |𝑤=𝑤 = [

(19)

This says, for the other-regarding agent with skill level w = 𝑤, he provides more
labor than a self-interested agent with skill level w = 𝑤 if and only if α < 1, which is the
usual situation. Similarly,

∂𝐿∗𝑖 |𝑤=𝑤
∂α

< 0,

∂𝐿∗𝑖 |𝑤=𝑤
∂β

= 0,meaning that for the highest skilled

person, his/her optimal labor supply is affected by how much people care about being
ahead, but is not affected by how much people care about being behind.
Let 𝐶 and 𝐶 denote the after-tax income of the wealthiest person and the poorest
person in the society, respectively. According to the incentive compatibility condition, 𝐶
and 𝐶 must also correspond to 𝑤, 𝑤. Based on (18) and (19):
1

1

(1 − 𝜏)𝑤{1 − 𝛼} 𝜎−1
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤{1 + 𝛽} 𝜎−1
𝜂 = 𝐶 − 𝐶 = (1 − 𝜏) {𝑤 ∙ [
]
−𝑤∙[
] }
𝜉
𝜉
∂η

(20)

∂η

It can be shown that ∂α < 0 and ∂β < 0, meaning that either increasing α or β will
decrease the gap between the wealthiest and the poorest. Next, we evaluate analytically
how inequality-averse and competitive preferences affect the consumption gap.
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Proposition 3
(a) For a given skill distribution and a given tax rate, the consumption gap is smaller
when agents are inequality averse (𝛼 > 0, 𝛽 > 0) rather than self-interested.
dα

(b) Recall that Ω = dβ. When agents are competitive (α < 0, β > 0)), for a given
skill distribution and a given tax rate, if Ω is sufficiently close to -1, the consumption gap
is larger than with self-interested agents; if Ω is sufficiently close to 0, the consumption
gap is smaller than with self-interested agents.
Proof of proposition 3(a):
Following eq. (20),
𝑑𝜂 =

𝜕𝜂
𝜕𝜂
𝑑𝛼 +
𝑑𝛽
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝛽
1

(1 − 𝜏)𝑤
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤(1 − 𝛼) 𝜎−1
=−
[
]
𝑑𝛼
(𝜎 − 1)(1 − 𝛼)
𝜉
1

(1 − 𝜏)𝑤
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤(1 + 𝛽) 𝜎−1
−
[
]
𝑑𝛽
(𝜎 − 1)(1 + 𝛽)
𝜉

(21)

When agents are inequality averse instead of self-interested, 𝑑𝛼 > 0, 𝑑𝛽 > 0. It can
be seen from (21) that 𝑑𝜂 < 0. So when agents become more inequality averse, the
consumption gap between the wealthiest and poorest shrinks.
Proof of proposition 3(b):
Starting with (21), when agents are competitive instead of self-interested, 𝑑𝛼 <
dα

0, 𝑑𝛽 > 0. The sign of 𝑑𝜂 becomes more complicated. Remember that Ω = dβ, and Ω ∈
[−1,0]. Substitute this into (21), and we get:
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𝑑𝜂 =

𝜕𝜂
𝜕𝜂
𝑑𝛼 +
𝑑𝛽
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝛽
1

(1 − 𝜏)𝑤
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤(1 − 𝛼) 𝜎−1
=−
[
]
Ω𝑑𝛽
(𝜎 − 1)(1 − 𝛼)
𝜉
1

(1 − 𝜏)𝑤
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤(1 + 𝛽) 𝜎−1
−
[
]
𝑑𝛽
(𝜎 − 1)(1 + 𝛽)
𝜉

(22)

First, if Ω = −1, then 𝑑𝛼 = −𝑑𝛽. Since we are investigating how the consumption
gap with competitive agents is affected compared with self-interested agents, if we
substitute this into (22), we have:
1

𝑑𝜂|𝛼=𝛽=0

(1 − 𝜏)𝑤
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤(1 − 𝛼) 𝜎−1
=−
[
]
Ω𝑑𝛽
(𝜎 − 1)(1 − 𝛼)
𝜉
1

(1 − 𝜏)𝑤
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤(1 + 𝛽) 𝜎−1
−
[
]
𝑑𝛽
(𝜎 − 1)(1 + 𝛽)
𝜉
1

=

(1 − 𝜏)𝜎−1+1
1

1

+1

(𝑤 𝜎−1

1

− 𝑤 𝜎−1+1 ) d𝛽 > 0

(23)

(𝜎 − 1)𝜉 𝜎−1
This says when 𝑑𝛼 = −𝑑𝛽, the consumption gap is larger than with self-interested
agents.
Second, if Ω = 0, then 𝑑𝛼 = 0, 𝑑𝛽 > 0. If we substitute these into (22), we have:
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1

𝑑𝜂|𝛼=𝛽=0

(1 − 𝜏)𝑤
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤(1 − 𝛼) 𝜎−1
=−
[
]
𝜙𝑑𝛽
(𝜎 − 1)(1 − 𝛼)
𝜉
1

(1 − 𝜏)𝑤
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤(1 + 𝛽) 𝜎−1
−
[
]
𝑑𝛽
(𝜎 − 1)(1 + 𝛽)
𝜉
1

(1 − 𝜏)𝑤 (1 − 𝜏)𝑤 𝜎−1
=−
[
]
𝑑𝛽 < 0
(𝜎 − 1)
𝜉

(24)

This says when 𝑑𝛼 = 0, the consumption gap is smaller than with self-interested
agents.
Lastly, assuming the consumption gap is continuous on α, we get proposition 3(b).∎
Proposition 3 is intuitive. Compared with self-interested agents, when agents are
inequality averse, the consumption gap undoubtedly decreases. However, compared with
self-interested agents, when agents are competitive, the conclusion is not that
straightforward. To ensure competitiveness leads to more consumption gap, agents need to
be concerned enough about being ahead relative to being behind. Thus, we can simulate
the wealthy work more; and since they are much more productive than the poor, the gap is
enhanced.
Of course the consumption gap above is a very limited and restricted way to represent
a society’s income inequality. In economics literature, the Gini coefficient is a commonly
used measure to evaluate a society’s income inequality (Dorfman, 1979; Lorenz, 1905). It
is defined as a ratio between 0 and 1, where 0 stands for perfect income equality, and 1
stands for perfect income inequality. As a result, as the Gini coefficient increases, the
society’s income inequality increases, too.
In this case, the Gini coefficient is calculated from the following formula:
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Gini = 1 −

∑𝑛𝑖=1 ℎ(𝑤𝑖 )(𝑆𝑖−1 + 𝑆𝑖 )
𝑆𝑛

where 𝑆𝑖 = ∑𝑖𝑗=1 ℎ(𝑤𝑖 )𝐶𝑖 and 𝑆𝑜 = 0.
Since analytically deriving the Gini coefficient and evaluating using the comparative
statics are too complicated, we will skip to simulations. In Table 3.4, we assume there is
no tax. The other parameters remain the same as in the tables above.
From Table 4, we observe the following:
(a) If both α and β increase in absolute terms while α is positive, people become more
inequality averse. We will then have a smaller Gini coefficient than with self-interested
agents, implying a smaller degree of income inequality.
(b) If both α and β increase in absolute terms while α is negative, agents become
more competitive. As long as −α < β, the Gini coefficient is smaller than with selfinterested agents, implying that competitiveness actually decreases the degree of income
inequality under this situation; as long as −α > β, the Gini coefficient is larger than with
self-interested agents, implying that competitiveness increases the degree of income
inequality under this situation.
In observation (b), the assumption established earlier that 𝛼 ∈ [−𝛽, 𝛽] is broken
because α < −β is needed to give the story’s complete description. The observation above
exists because when −α < β, competitive agents are more concerned about falling behind
than being ahead. It leads to a general "catching up" trend in the society, causing a higher
degree of equality since this "catching up" trend is very weak for the top wealthy, who are
much more productive than the rest and can potentially dramatically decrease income
inequality. If using the opposing assumption (−α > β, meaning we enjoy being ahead of
89

others more than suffering from being behind), the Gini coefficient is actually larger than
self-interested agents, implying a larger degree of income inequality.
(c)
L*

  



As

long

α

(1   ) w(1   )



=

-β,

the

Gini

coefficient

doesn’t

change

because

. Here the optimal labor does not depend on where one is in

terms of wage distribution anymore. Hence, all people increase their labor supply relatively
the same compared with the traditional case (α = β = 0), and the society’s consumption
distribution does not change.
Lastly, we use simulations to show how the other-regarding preferences per se can
be served as a redistributive tool. Table 3.5 shows the Gini coefficients under two different
settings. Note that we still assume ξ = 2.55 and σ = 3. As Table 3.5 shows, when the tax
rate is 0.0735 and agents are self-interested, the Gini coefficient is 0.4388. The same
coefficient can also be achieved when there is no tax and when agents are inequality averse
(α = β = 0.3). This suggests that we do not need a government to use the income tax tool
to redistribute income; appropriate inequality-averse preferences can do that for us. The
same can also happen with competitive preferences. For example, when the tax rate is
0.0085 and agents are self-interested, the Gini coefficient is 0.4696. This same level of
inequality can also be accomplished when agents are competitive (α = −0.2, β = 0.3)
without an income tax system.

4. Conclusion
Rich and nuanced models of behavior are being developed to capture various facets
of fairness and the implications for individual choice and collective action. In this study,
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we develop a model allowing for both competitive and inequality-averse preferences. The
model allows the externality of being behind to differ from the externality of being ahead.
Our goal is to assess the role of other regarding preferences in influencing the degree of
redistribution and the effect on social-inequality degree and ultimately the equityefficiency tradeoff.
We show that relative to agents with traditional self-interested preferences,
competitive agents work more and consume more, leading to greater total income and tax
revenue. However, when with inequality-averse agents, we find a threshold wage exists
where all agents higher than that threshold provide less labor while all agents lower than
that threshold provide more. Thus, the effect on total tax revenue is also more complicated.
This complexity suggests that, including the possibility of inequality aversion, the
government may no longer be able to collect more taxes based on these other-regarding
preferences in a society consisting of purely competitive agents. Finally, analytical and
simulation results jointly show that a society consisting of inequality-averse agents has less
of a consumption gap and a smaller Gini coefficient than a society consisting of selfinterested agents. In other words, preferences for equality may lead to more equitable
outcomes even without changes in the tax policy. On the other hand, stronger competitive
preferences increase the degree of inequality only when concerns for being ahead is
sufficiently large relative to concerns for being behind. The above results suggest that a
more equitable outcome may be achieved, at least to some extent, by fostering an aversion
to inequality, or sometimes even a competitiveness at the preference level. Further, these
various types of other-regarding preferences can be equivalent to a linear income tax
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regulated by a social planner. This contrasts with the view that a planner or government
with these “preferences” is required to pursue a goal of equity distribution. The work that
has been presented here is preliminary and reflects the first steps in our inquiry. Ultimately,
our interest is to understand the consequences of other-regarding preferences for
redistribution on the size of the tax base, efficiency, and the equity-efficiency tradeoff. An
especially important question is whether other regarding preferences will allow the pursuit
of social-equity objectives without harming economic efficiency. Also, the assumption of
a linear income tax was made primarily for simplicity and ease of exposition. It is thus
intriguing to explore the consequences of including a non-linear income tax and how these
other-regarding parameters may influence the optimal tax schedule.
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Appendix

Table 3.1 The optimal labor supply

H(w)

Benchmark

Competitive

Inequality Averse

(α = β=0)

(α=-0.5; β=0.8)

(α=0.5; β=0.8)

5%

0.0485

0.0648

0.0639

52.34%

1.8156

2.3272

1.9211

82.71%

2.4015

2.9916

2.0444
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Table 3.2 The average consumption

Average

β=0

β=0.1

β=0.2

β=0.3

β=0.4

β=0.5

Consumption
α= -0.5

52.5908

α= -0.4

50.8075

51.2134

48.9594

49.3803

49.7948

47.0386

47.4765

47.9071

48.3308

45.0361

45.4930

45.9418

46.3828

46.8166

43.4190

43.8884

44.3490

44.8014

45.2461

41.7340

42.2171

42.6908

43.1557

43.6124

40.4694

40.9575

41.4363

41.9063

39.1374

39.6316

40.1164

37.7263

38.2278

α= -0.3
α= -0.2
α= -0.1
α= 0
α= 0.1
α= 0.2
α= 0.3
α= 0.4
α= 0.5

42.9402

36.2202
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Table 3.3 The average tax revenue

Average

β=0

β=0.1

β=0.2

β=0.3

β=0.4

β=0.5

Tax
Revenue
α= -0.5

18.4068

α= -0.4

17.7826

17.9247

17.1358

17.2831

17.4282

16.4635

16.6168

16.7675

16.9158

15.7626

15.9226

16.0796

16.2340

16.3858

15.1967

15.3610

15.5222

15.6805

15.8362

14.6069

14.7760

14.9418

15.1045

15.2643

14.1643

14.3351

14.5027

14.6672

13.6981

13.8711

14.0407

13.2042

13.3797

α= -0.3
α= -0.2
α= -0.1
α= 0
α= 0.1
α= 0.2
α= 0.3
α= 0.4
α= 0.5

15.0291

12.6771
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Table 3.4 The Gini coefficient

β=0

β=0.1

β=0.2

β=0.3

β=0.4

β=0.5

α= -0.5

0.4920

0.4880

0.4842

0.4805

0.4770

0.4736

α= -0.4

0.4891

0.4850

0.4811

0.4773

0.4736

0.4702

α= -0.3

0.4859

0.4817

0.4776

0.4736

0.4699

0.4663

α= -0.2

0.4824

0.4779

0.4736

0.4696

0.4657

0.4620

α= -0.1

0.4783

0.4736

0.4692

0.4650

0.4610

0.4572

α= 0

0.4736

0.4688

0.4642

0.4598

0.4557

0.4517

0.4632

0.4584

0.4539

0.4496

0.4454

0.4517

0.4470

0.4425

0.4382

0.4388

0.4342

0.4298

0.4243

0.4197

α= 0.1
α= 0.2
α= 0.3
α= 0.4
α= 0.5

0.4075
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Table 5 Other-regarding preferences as a redistributive tool

Gini coefficient

𝛂=𝛃=𝟎

𝛂 = 𝛃 = 𝟎. 𝟑

𝛂 = −𝟎. 𝟐,
𝛃 = 𝟎. 𝟑

𝛕=𝟎

0.4736

0.4388

𝛕 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟕𝟑𝟓

0.4388

0.4066

𝛕 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟖𝟓

0.4696

0.4696

0.4656
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CONCLUSION
The current project contributes to the burgeoning literature on other-regarding
preferences. Since the “Easterlin Paradox” was discovered, many studies interested in the
relationship between income and happiness have found that it is not, at least primarily, our
own income that determines our reported well-being. Chapter 1 contributes to this growing
body of literature and finds that after controlling for a series of control variables, the
absolute income’s effect has a negligible effect on happiness. Just as the Easterlin Paradox
suggests, this finding may explain why many countries’ subjective well-being levels did
not increase as GDP levels increased during recent decades.
Furthermore, chapter 1 explores the role of relative income. Previous studies in this
area have focused on either homogenous or uniformly asymmetric relative income effects.
In contrast, chapter 1 takes a different approach and assumes each person’s relative income
effect depends on own that person’s income level. We find that as the absolute income
level increases, the magnitude of these income-dependent relative income effect decreases
(in absolute value).
Chapter 2 applies the income-dependent relative income effects in a traditional nonlinear optimal income tax model. It shows that allowing for relative income effects’
heterogeneity can significantly affect optimal income tax rates as well as progressivity.
While the selection of wage distribution and whether absolute or relative income dominates
do not play important roles in deciding the progressivity degree, whether the effects are
positively or negatively related to own income is critical. Greater optimal progressivity
arises as wealthier taxpayers have stronger relative-income effects.
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In chapter 3, we not only consider relative income (competitive) effects, but also
inequality averse preferences. We develop a model allowing for both. The model allows
the externality of being behind to differ from the externality of being ahead. We show that
relative to agents with traditional self-interested preferences, competitive agents work more
and consume more, leading to greater total income and tax revenue. However, when with
inequality-averse agents, we find a threshold wage exists where all agents higher than that
threshold provide less labor while all agents lower than that threshold provide more. Thus,
the effect on total tax revenue is also more complicated. We also use analytical and
simulation results jointly to show that a society consisting of inequality-averse agents has
less of a consumption gap and a smaller Gini coefficient than a society consisting of selfinterested agents. In other words, preferences for equality may lead to more equitable
outcomes even without changes in the tax policy. On the other hand, stronger competitive
preferences increase the degree of inequality only when concerns for being ahead is
sufficiently large relative to concerns for being behind. The above results suggest that a
more equitable outcome may be achieved, at least to some extent, by fostering an aversion
to inequality, or sometimes even a competitiveness at the preferable level.
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